Averroës on Aristotle’s Criticism of his Predecessors:

An annotated translation of the long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics A

 

Comments 1-8

 

Direct links to the comments:

 

 

 

#1, Tafsīr 55.4-56.13, on 987a6-9:

            Jaeger’s text: (Some of the older thinkers posited one corporeal cause and others more,)[1] but both (groups) put these in the form of matter, with some positing both this cause and besides it that whence comes motion, and for some this (cause) was one; for others, two.

(Arabic) T(ext of Aristotle)1         [Naẓīf (نظيف) b. Ayman (writes):][2] (Some) posited[3] as the principle of every kind of body some one thing, it being of material kind, but then people posited this cause and subjoined to it a thing from which is motion; and some of them made it two; others, one. [In the Greek (next) about half a page is blank.]

(Averroës) C(omment)1a Since the first physicists of the ancients had agreed that the principle of all existents was one of the four elements, some of them positing that it was fire, others that it was air, and others water, to the extent that earth is exempted, as we will say (later herein) is assumed about it -- except for saying that it accompanies laws -- [(Aristotle) says] in reporting on them, “they posited as the principle of every kind of body some one thing, it being of material kind.” [He means][4] that the ancients posited some one thing of each kind of the simple bodies as the principle; that is, some of them posited fire, and others air, and others water; but he only[5] [says] “it being of material kind,” because matter is potential and these (bodies) are actual, and because matter really neither comes to be nor passes away, while each one of them undergoes coming to be-passing away.[6] And they were unaware of reasons[7] except the reason in the material mode.

C1b     [Then he says] “and then people posited this cause and subjoined to it a thing from which is motion; and some of them made it two; others, one.” [He means] that some of the people who came after these (monists) then said what they had said about the material reason, while they added the cause which is the mover and the agent, and of these some posited this cause as one, and others posited it as two. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#2, Tafsīr 56.14-58.3, on 987a9-13:

            Until the Italians, then, and apart from them, the others spoke rather obscurely(?)[8] about these (causes), except as we say they happen to use two causes, and of these the other, that whence is motion, some make one and others two.

T2        Up to the time of the Italians the talk of the others apart from them on these (causes) was insignificant speech, except that as I have said of those who make the causes two, they differ in the latter cause, I mean the thing from which motion arises, in that some of them say that it is one; others, two.[9]

C2a     He probably means [by his saying] “up to the time of the Italians” that the business about crediting these two causes, I mean the material and the agent, persists to the time of this sect.

C2b     [And his saying] “and the talk of the others on these had been insignificant speech” just has him account for desiring the cause which is in the formal mode; that is to say, he had reported on this in an essay other than this one about Empedocles,[10] I mean that he used to affect[11] know-ledge of what was bone and flesh, but (Aristotle) did not clarify (there) that the essence of things is necessarily that the principle is other than the six princi-ples this man used to posit, I mean the four elements he posited in the material mode, and the love and enmity he posited in the mode of agent.

C2c     [And his saying] “except that as I have said of those who make the causes two, they differ in the latter cause, I mean the thing from which is motion, in that some of them say that it is one; others, two” is a self-explana-tory statement, and with it he alludes (respectively) to Anaxagoras, who used to posit mind alone as the mover, and to Empedocles, who posited the mover as two, love and enmity. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#3, Tafsīr 58.4-60.4, on 987a13-21[12]:

            In the same way the Pythagoreans have spoken of two principles, while they said as much that is peculiar to them -- that they thought the bounded and the unbounded [and the one] [13] were not natures of some other (things), such as fire or earth or some other of this kind; rather, (for them) the unlimited itself and the one itself are the essence of those (things) to which they are assigned, wherefore also number is the essence of all (things). About these (issues), then, they proclaimed in this way, and they began to speak of and define “what is.”

T3        The Pythagoreans said that the principles were two essentially in this mode, and this was manifest for them, but then they distinguish it with doctrine on the limited and the one and the unlimited, and their practice did not entail naming another thing, a nature like fire or earth or what is more like that; rather, (for them) the unlimited itself and the one in its essence are substance, and by these (considerations), then, they come to posit them and to enumerate them. [In the Greek (there is) some white (space)].

C3a     [He says] that the Pythagoreans agreed with the physicists on their statement that the principles were two only, but in accordance with the way it appeared to them, not in accordance with the way it appeared to the physicists that they were two. He only says that because their statement on the nature of this two-fold (disposition) was not the statement of the latter on it.

C3b     And by way of what he mentions of what these two parties subscribe to, and they are only two, he mentions what characterizes (the Pythagoreans), [and so says] “but then they distinguish it with doctrine on the limited and the one and the unlimited.” [He means] that what the Pythagoreans distinguish with it is that they make these two-fold: one principle, the limited and the one, they designate as one meaning; while the second principle is the unlimited. According to them these are two-fold in the mode of matter and form, not in the mode of matter and agent as it was for the older of the physicists.

C3c     [Then he says] “and their practice did not entail naming another thing, a nature like fire or earth or what is more like that; rather, (for them) the unlimited itself and the one in its essence are substance.” [He means] that these people did not attribute a natural basis to natural affairs,[14] I mean moving affairs, when they made these two principles common to all natural existents, as did the physicists in making the principle of natural affairs a natural principle like fire or earth. By this he simply indicates their failure in not positing a natural principle for natural things.

C3d     They only posited these two principles of things, whence they held that the two were the principles of number, that number was the substance of natural things, and that the principles of substance were (themselves) a substance; and this is what he indicates [with his (just quoted) saying] “rather, (for them) the unlimited itself and the one in its essence are substance.” [He means] that, rather, they made only the unlimited itself and the one in its essence principle(s) of existents, whence they were substance, and whence it was that these two principles were substance also by being the principle of number, which was the substance of existents. That is to say, (for them) the principle of substance is necessarily (itself) a substance.

C3e     [And his saying] “and by these (considerations), then, they come to posit them and to enumerate them” [means] that they have made existents from these two principles that they say are number, meaning that since they believed that existents were number and that the principles of numbers were the one and the many, they said that these two (magnitudes) were the principles of existents. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#4, Tafsīr 60.5-62.14, on 987a21-28 (concluding Chapter 5):

            (The Pythagoreans began to do that) but they worked it out too simply. For they defined superficially, and they named the first (example) to which the stated definition belonged as the substance of the thing, just as if one thought double and the number two were the same because double belongs first to the number two.  But it is not really the same to be double and two; otherwise many would be one, which indeed followed for them. So much, then, is to be grasped from the first (philos-o-phers) [and the others].[15]

T4        (The Pythagoreans) employed much[16] simple reflection in their demarcation of the perceptible, and the first existent [in the definition][17] was what they kept in mind; and what they used to suppose was that the substance of the issue is like a person supposing that double and two-ness are one thing in essence, because double is prior to two-ness; nonetheless, it is not so in the aspect in which, if something is double, then due to that it is two in essence; for if that were not so one would be many, and this is what happened for them. Other things like this might be found from the foregoing and later.[18]

C4a     [His saying] “and they employed much simple reflection in their demarcation of the perceptible, and the first existent [in the definition] was what they kept in mind” [means] that, since they wanted to consider existents, these people, meaning the Pythagoreans, made their consideration of them too sim-ple as soon as they demarcated the first existent, that is, the worthiest of (existents) in existence, to be that which they most knew. (To them) knowledge, that is, substance, was by definition what they recalled, that is, in their statement that (substance) is one and unlimited and that it is number.

C4b     [Then he says] “and what they used to suppose was that the substance of a thing is like a person supposing that double and two-ness are one thing in essence, because double is prior to two-ness; nonetheless, it is not so in the aspect in which, if something is double, then due to that it is two in essence.” [He means] that their view that the nature of existents is the nature of number, by means of numbers being ascribed to existents and being portrayed in them, is like the view of one who believes that double and two-ness are one thing in essence, that is, of one nature, by means of double being more general that two-ness and naturally prior to it.  That is, what is prescribed is something which, when it disappears, the other disappears, but when the other disappears it does not disappear, while when the other exists it exists.

C4c     [Then he says (as just quoted)] “nonetheless, it is not so in the aspect in which, if something is double, then due to that it is two in essence.” [He means] that, nonetheless, the mode in which a thing is a double is not the mode where it is two; meaning that, (given) one thing in itself, when it proves correct that more than one (thing) is ascribed to it, it is not entailed that the correctness be in the same mode, so that both would be one thing, nor that the ascription distinguish the substance of the thing.

C4d     [Then he says] “and if that were not so one would be many.” [He means] that if the nature of the latter thing is not different from the nature of the former, the nature of one and the nature of plurality are the same, or plurality is predicated of one. He only means by this that if existents are numbers by means of number being prior to existents, then many is one; and one, many.

C4e     [And his saying] “and this is what happened for them” [means] that the absurdity of one holding that existents are number is like the absurdity of one holding that one is many, that is, that opposites are the same by their being in one thing.

C4f      [And his saying] “And other things similar to this might be found from the foregoing and later” [means] that many things might be found from matters being prior according to the senses in this way of priority, having this meaning by degree of number; and then a substance is not naturally distinguished by being number without the rest of things being prior according to (this way of priority). All this goes back to “foregoing” in the definition not necessarily being some previous thing in existence. We will explain this more in the treatises on substance (coming later in the Tafsīr).

(back to top) (annotation)

 

#5, Tafsīr 62.15-65.4, on 987a29-b2 (beginning Chapter 6):

            After the cited philosophies ensued the study of Plato, greatly following them[19] but also having its peculiarity in relation to the Italian philosophy. For in his youth he became well acquainted first with Cratylus and the Heraclitian opinions,[20] how all the senses are always flow-ing, and knowledge of them is not substantial, and thus he also retained these (opinions) later. And Socrates was concerned with ethics, while not at all with nature; (rather, he sought the general in [ethics], and was the first to fix thought on their definitions.)[21]

T5        And after what has been cited of types of philosophy the philosophy of Plato arose, and for the most part it followed them, and as to details[22] his philosophy was in accordance with the opinion of the Italians. First was what happened after Democritus:[23] the opinions of the Heracliteans that all existents are continually flowing and that there is no science of them, and upon this (encounter) he accepted these opinions in the sequel. And then Socrates only spoke on moral practices, and did not talk at all of anything in nature.[24] [In the Greek there is a lacuna or blank.]

C5a     [He says] that the philosophy of Plato arose after what arose of these kinds of philosophy, [that is,] after the philosophy of adherents of numbers, who were the partisans of Pythagoras and in general those who made mathematics the principle(s?)[25] of existing concerns, and after the philosophy of the physicists, who were the partisans of Anaxagoras, the partisans of Empedocles, and the partisans of Democritus.

C5b     [And his saying] on the philosophy of Plato, that “for the most part it followed them,” [is] that in most of his opinions on existents Plato follows the orientation of the adherents of numbers, that is, the Pythagoreans and any who approximate them, at least the associates of the Italians, and they are what is known today for the realm of Europe and there (in Italy). And God knows[26] the first physicists were Anaxa-goras and his partisans and Empedocles and his partisans and Democritus and his partisans. (Aristotle) says that in most of his philosophy Plato follows those who made mathematics the reasons for sensory subjects, or sensory subjects in themselves, only because Plato used to support forms and to hold that the nature of forms and the nature of numbers were the same, on which we will expound in the treatises of this science on substance.[27] He was wont to hold that the four elements were composites of the sides and angles of equal surfaces, and these are the five bodies cited in the last book of Euclid. He only followed the physicists in his statement on primary matter and in his statement on the four elements being primary; I mean that the sensory composites are entirely composed of them.

C5c     [And his saying] “but first was what happened after so-and-so,” [that is,] a man of the adherents of natural science: “the Heraclitean opinions.” They (i.e., presumably the holders of these opinions)[28] were those who were skeptical of all who were engaged in philosophy at that time, and so said that there was no science there, because science is necessary and eternal, while nothing there pertains to science except sensory things, and they are always changing; and surely when (something) is always changing the science of it is always changing; but changeable science is not science. So there was no science there (in their opinion).

C5d     [Then he says] “and upon this (encounter) he accepted these opinions in the sequel.” [He means] that these opinions we have cited, then, are those that investigators got to in philosophy, meaning up to (Plato’s) time.

C5e     And since he has brought in no account of Socrates, and he was one of the well-known sages, [(Aristotle) says] “and then Socrates only spoke on moral practices, and did not talk at all of anything in nature.” [He means] that he was the first to speak on ethical philosophy, and did not add anything to what anyone who preceded him had said on scientific philosophy. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#6, Tafsīr 65.5-70.5, on 987b4-19:

            (Since Socrates did that,) then, accepting such as was according to this(?),[29](Plato) took up this (generality) as being about other things, and not about the senses; for a common delineation of any of the sensible things is impossible with them always changing. Thus, then, he referred to things of this sort as ideas,[30] saying that sensory things were entirely apart from them and named for them;[31] for <the many synonyms>[32] are homonyms of the forms by participation. He only changed the name, to “participation,” for the Pythagor-e-ans say entities are (themselves) by imitation of num-bers, but Plato by participation, chan-g-ing the name. But the participation or imitation of the forms (itself) is common (to both) in being left out of the investigation. Moreover, be-sides sensory things and forms, he says the mathematical of subjects are intermediate, differing from sensory things in being eternal and motionless, and from forms in being similar to many while the form itself is only one each. And since (to him) the forms were the causes of the other things, (he thought their elements were the elements of all beings.)[33]

T6        (And ?)[34] (Plato) approved that because he inferred that the being of this (concern of Socrates?)[35] was in the pattern of the being of the rest of things, while nothing in sensory things is fixed, nor as well is it possible for there to be a definition in which sensory things participate, since they are endlessly altering.  He called those (aspects) of existents that were in essence the same forms,[36] while (for him) all the sense impressions are only said to be of[37] these (forms) and on account of them; and the many agreeing in name are common in species,[38] except that he added participation in the name. The Pythagoreans said that existents were numbers in the mode of comparison, but Plato added participation in the name, and then they neglected general investigation into what the participation or comparison among species was. They were only opposed on sensory things and mathematical species, which they say are intermediate between subjects:[39] either the senses, and some of them are always unmoving, or the species, and they are what exists for many, and the (individual abstract) species is an existing thing that is the same for all. Also, the species is the cause of the other things. [Here is a lacuna in the Greek.][40]

C6a     Since doubting the Heracliteans was what moved Plato to the doctrine on the forms he embraced, in this section (Aristotle) takes up -- and God knows (this) -- relating how it moved him to that (doctrine) to the point of making it necessary for him to be convinced of the forms. [(Aristotle’s saying] “(he approved that) because he inferred that the being of this was in the pattern of the being of the rest of things, while nothing in sensory things is fixed” [probably means] that it moved Plato to the doctrine and the forms by the example, only in that he found in each genus, and in each species, that the being of the individual referring to (the species) in that (genus) was on the model of the being of the rest of the individuals in that genus without the affair failing, and that it was impossible for this to arise by accident. He held that “nothing in sensory things is fixed, nor as well is it possible for there to be a definition in which sensory things participate, since they are endlessly altering.”[41] He held that meanings existing for the individuals of each species were the same in essence, and that definitions of things were concerns necessarily outside of the mind, and he called them forms and models. That is, they are forms for sensory things, while models for nature have them in view, just as the manufacturer has the form of the manufactured in view; or else a thing would not agree with what the thing agreed with: a human would not always come from the sperm of a human, nor always a horse from the sperm of a horse.

C6b     [Then he says] “while (for Plato) all the sense impressions, are only said to be of these (just cited forms and models?)[42] and on account of them.” [He means] that they (i.e. the followers of Plato) hold instead of this (i.e., that horse and human would be conflated) that all sensory things are only delimited by this nature, and only exist on account of it, just as a thing exists by means of its model; that is, their arrangement and coherence only exist on account of the model.

C6c     [His saying] “and the many agreeing in name are common in species, except that he added participation in the name” [means] except that the agreed-upon names are what indicate one common meaning of many things, while as to the (just prior) statement on forms, there is no one common meaning for the pluralities here; and then the names of the species entail being common, and then there is no general meaning there, only the wording, and thus [he says] “except that he added participation in the name.”

C6d     [Then he says] “the Pythagoreans said that existents were numbers in the mode of comparison, but Plato added participation in the name.” [He means] then that the impetus of the Pythagoreans to holding that existents were numbers was only that they likened numbers to existents and then held that existents were them in themselves; and so for them the existence of a common name between numbers and existents was not required, nor did the impetus to their doctrine (require) adding a common name for species. But Plato added the common name, or persisted in holding it.

C6e     And in this (Aristotle) probably only refers to some of the ancients having held that the causes of existents were universal genera like the one and the existent, not that they held that there was a common name here. Hence Parmenides erred as soon as he did not distinguish between the name of the existent indicating one in number and indicating one in genus, and so held that the entire existent was one in number.

C6f      [Then he says] “and then they neglected investigation into what the participation and comparison among species was.” In this he points to Plato, that is to say, in that the investigation of the participation that is among individuals neglected participation among species, while it had been incumbent on him to investigate participation among species. (Aristotle) only says that because it is contingent that when (Plato) says the ultimate species are forms, he (must) speak like that on the remaining species, and then there are forms of forms, and that passes to infinity; otherwise, he (would have to) say that all species are mental things, existing in the mind, not that existence for them is outside the mind.

C6g     [His saying] “and they were only opposed on sensory things and mathematical species, which they say are intermediate between subjects” [means] that the reason that they only contemplated the nature of species, and did not contemplate the nature of genera, was that their appraisal was only by way of opposition, not by way of research into what species are. Therefore, since the people (i.e., the Platonists) opposed the Heraclitean doubt about science arising from sensory things and from things which concern sensory things, while they said mathematics was in the forms, and was by nature intermediate between forms and sensory things, truly for them the mistrust in both subjects was dissolved altogether by this statement.  If they perceived the subject by reckoning its nature the response would be the same for sensory things and mathematics.

C6h     And since all this opposition was unsound, he cites the proper opposition with which one ought to oppose (the Heracliteans), [and so says] “(mathematics is intermediate between subjects,) either the senses, and some of them are always unmoving, or the species, and they are what exists for many, and the (individual abstract) species is an existing thing that is the same for all. Also, the species is the cause of the other things.” [He means] that their statement that the senses are not always in alteration is healthy opposition if it is said by them that there is something in sensory existents that is not variable in its essence, but rather is fixed: the form, while what eternally alters in them is the matter.

C6i      [And as to his (already cited) saying] “or the species, and they are what exists for many, and the (individual abstract) species is an existing thing that is the same for all,” he only says it in opposition to the doctrine of the forms and in opposition to those who say there is nothing here that individuals share except the name alone, i.e., the abolishers of science. That is to say, when it is apparent from the definition of species that the meaning of the existent for multitudes, in the mode that each (multitude) is existent, is in number, then it is apparent that it is impossible for the abstracted forms to be existent for sensory things by being (the latter), let alone for there to be knowledge of their existence and of their quid-dities.[43] Similarly, it is apparent from this definition that the majority of what have species predicated of them share the same meaning, not (just) the same expression.

C6k     [And as to his (already cited) saying] “and the species is the cause of the other things,” or a cause of some other things, by it [he only] intends the cause of the knowledge of individuals, not the cause of the individuals. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#7, Tafsīr 70.6-71.15, on 987b21-25:

            (As matter, then, the great and the small were principles; and as substance, the one.)[44] For out of those (i.e., the great and the small),)[45] by participation in the one, are forms and numbers (?).[46] Thus, now, in saying that the one is substance rather than something else that is said to be one, (Plato) spoke close beside the Pythagoreans, and in like manner to them on numbers being the causes of the substances of other things.

T7        Then species are what are from those (?)[47] in the mode of participation in the one, and then one who says that the one is substance, and is not another existing thing said to be one, has nearly spoken the doctrine of the Pythagoreans that numbers are the cause of the substance of other things, for this is their opinion.

C7a     [(As to) his saying] “then the species is[48] what are from those in the mode of participation in the one,” [he probably means] by this the distinction between individual and species, while [his saying] “and what are from those” is an allusion to the individuals, as if to say that the one meaning in the things cited for them in a mode whereby they do not contribute to it, but rather it singles out each unity from them, is the individual unity, while the one meaning that exists in common with them is called the species.

C7b     [His saying] “and then one who says that the one is substance, and is not another existing thing said to be one, has nearly spoken the doctrine of the Pythagoreans” [means] that one who says that the one in number is substance, not another thing existing here that is said to be one in another way, not one in number, has nearly spoken the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, “that numbers are the cause of the substance of other things.”[49]   He only [says] “nearly” because they (i.e., the Platonists) were enamored of the undivided part, for according to them these (numbers) are not substance or one except as this part. And then impossibilities adhere to them that adhere to anyone who says that the substances of things are numbers (i.e., like the Pythagoreans); that is to say, neither faction has been able to say how any contiguity arises from these (substances or numbers), nor how this “one” is an undivided cause of effect and action and transformation. For if an alteration is obtained it is a composite of matter and form, while every composite of matter and form is divisible. And all this was explained in (Aristotle’s works on) natural science.[50]

(back to top) (annotation)

 

#8, Tafsīr 71.16-75.3, on 987b25-988a2:

            But instead of the unlimited as one (Plato) made the dyad: the unlimited from great and small, this being peculiar (to him).  Moreover, he (made) the numbers apart from sense perceptions, while (the Pythagoreans) say the numbers themselves are things and do not put mathematical things between them. Then this making the one and the numbers apart from things, not like the Pythagoreans, and the introduction of forms, were generated from investigation by reasoning -- for the first (philosophers) did not partake of dialectic -- while making the other nature a dyad was according to the numbers except the primes(?)[51] being generated from it naturally, like from some template.[52] Nevertheless, what ensues is the opposite; for this is not reasonable. For they make many (things) from matter, .

T8        Of them (i.e., presumably the combination of Platonists and Pythagoreans) some made two instead of the unlimited a unity, and some of them made the unlimited from the great and the small, and this then was characteristic (of them), and some of them made numbers from[53] sensory things, and some of them said these affairs (i.e., the sensory things) were numbers,[54] not putting math-e-mati-cal things between them. And then those who made the one and the numbers something other than (sensory?)[55] affairs, not like what the Pytha-gore-ans did, only arrive at species by investigating accor-d-ing to definitions, while there was no art of debate with the earlier (thinkers). And those who made the other nature twofold by means of the num-bers except the primes originating from it as a natural issuance, just as a thing ori-gi-nates from a thing resembling it, are in opposition to what happens. And then holding these (numbers) to be from matter proceeds correctly. [In the Greek (here is) a gap of about half a page.]

C8a     He says that of those who made the principles two, the one and the unlimited, some of them made the unlimited generated from two-ness; they did not make two-ness an opposition (i.e., of members of a pair) like those who made it from the great and the small, and that is what he indicates [with his saying] “(they made two instead of the unlimited) some unity” [that is,] they did not make (the two-ness) a two-ness.

C8b     [Then he says] “and some of them made the cause of the unlimited the great and the small, and this then was characteristic (of them).” [He means] that some of them made the cause of the unlimited the two-ness that is the great and the small, both of which pass in (their) magnitudes to infinity; and he only [says] “and this then was characteristic (of them)” because they made three principles for what the ancients had agreed were two opposites, on the one hand the great and the small, and on the other the substratum[56] that admits the two, which is one; and those who made the principles the one and the unlimited, generated from two-ness, did not in the least make the one and the unlimited a substratum of the two opposites.

C8c     [His saying] “and some of them made numbers from sensory things, and some of them said these affairs were numbers” [means] that of those who said that the principles were numbers, some made numbers a component of sensory things, that is, forms for them, and they were the adherents of forms and numbers, while some of them, namely, the Pythagoreans, said the sensory things were themselves numbers.

C8d     Since among the holders of the forms some made numbers, and in general the subject[57] of mathematics, natures intermediate between forms and sensory things, while the Pythagoreans were not holding either of the two statements (i.e., neither that numbers were intermediate nor that mathematics was intermediate), but were only wont to say that numbers as a whole were that from which existents were composed, [he says] right after (speaking) on their statement, “they do not put math-e-mati-cal things between them (i.e., sensory things).” Probably he only says this on the authority of those who say numbers are forms; that is to say, these (people of whom we have been speaking) are two groups: some of them say that numbers and forms are of the same nature, while others of them say that the nature of numbers is other than the nature of forms, and is a nature intermediate between forms and sensory things, according to what he relates of the ancients in the thirteenth(?) (essay) of this book.[58]

C8e     [Then he says] “and then those who made the one and the numbers from (sensory?) affairs, not like what the Pytha-gore-ans did, only arrive at species by investigating accor-d-ing to definitions.”  [He means] that those who made the one and numbers a component of sensory affairs, that is, a formal component, and did not say number was itself the existents as did the Pythagoreans, only arrived at the doctrine of forms and the doctrine that they were (i.e., included) numbers by means of their investigation according to the nature of definitions, I mean from where in them form comes. Things (that are attempted to be) defined outside of the mind are variable, and then according to them that makes it necessary to make the locus of definitions, or definitions in themselves, forms, and according to them makes necessary the situation of the forms being in these (things), I mean their being an abstraction(?)[59] of (plural) matter,[60] lest their nature be other than the nature of number.  That is to say, if the forms exist it is not possible for their nature to be other than the nature of number.

C8f      [Then he says] “and those who made the other nature twofold by means of the num-bers except the primes originating from it as a natural issuance, just as a thing ori-gi-nates from a thing resembling it, are in opposition to what happens. And then holding these (numbers) to be from matter proceeds correctly.” [He means] that those who posit the twofold as being of the nature of matter, not of the nature of forms, by means of the undistinguished numbers being generated from it as a natural issuance, just as a thing is generated from what it resembles, and that it is the cause of the unlimited, have spoken correctly, because if this were an accidental affair of the two-ness this action would not always be found, because what is found of the thing by accident is contrary to this, I mean it rarely happens to the thing.

C8g     And this is what he indicates [in his (already cited) saying] “that is in opposition to what happens.”[61]

(back to top) (annotation) (comments 9-16)