Averroës
on Aristotle’s Criticism of his Predecessors:
An annotated translation of the long commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics A
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#1,
Tafsīr 55.4-56.13, on 987a6-9:
Jaeger’s text: (Some of the older
thinkers posited one corporeal cause and others more,)[1] but both (groups) put these in
the form of matter, with some positing both this cause and besides it that whence
comes motion, and for some this (cause) was one; for others, two.
(Arabic) T(ext of
Aristotle)1 [Naẓīf
(نظيف) b. Ayman (writes):][2] (Some) posited[3]
as the principle of every kind of body some one thing, it being of material
kind, but then people posited this cause and subjoined to it a thing from which
is motion; and some of them made it two; others, one. [In the Greek (next) about half a page is
blank.]
(Averroës)
C(omment)1a Since the first
physicists of the ancients had agreed that the principle of all existents was
one of the four elements, some of them positing that it was fire, others that
it was air, and others water, to the extent that earth is exempted, as we will
say (later herein) is assumed about it -- except for saying that it accompanies
laws -- [(Aristotle) says] in reporting on them,
“they posited as the principle of every kind of body some one thing, it being
of material kind.” [He means][4]
that the ancients posited some one thing of each kind of the simple bodies as
the principle; that is, some of them posited fire, and others air, and others
water; but he only[5]
[says] “it being of material kind,” because matter is potential and these
(bodies) are actual, and because matter really neither comes to be nor passes
away, while each one of them undergoes coming to be-passing away.[6] And they were unaware of reasons[7]
except the reason in the material mode.
C1b [Then he says] “and then people posited
this cause and subjoined to it a thing from which is motion; and some of them made
it two; others, one.” [He means] that
some of the people who came after these (monists) then said what they had said
about the material reason, while they added the cause which is the mover and
the agent, and of these some posited this cause as one, and others posited it
as two. (back to top)
(annotation)
#2,
Tafsīr 56.14-58.3, on 987a9-13:
Until the Italians, then, and
apart from them, the others spoke rather obscurely(?)[8]
about these (causes), except as we say they happen to use two causes, and of
these the other, that whence is motion, some make one and others two.
T2 Up to the time of the Italians the talk
of the others apart from them on these (causes) was insignificant speech,
except that as I have said of those who make the causes two, they differ in the
latter cause, I mean the thing from which motion arises, in that some of them
say that it is one; others, two.[9]
C2a He probably means [by his saying] “up to
the time of the Italians” that the business about crediting these two causes, I
mean the material and the agent, persists to the time of this sect.
C2b [And his saying] “and the talk of the
others on these had been insignificant speech” just has him account for
desiring the cause which is in the formal mode; that is to say, he had reported
on this in an essay other than this one about Empedocles,[10]
I mean that he used to affect[11] knowledge of what was bone and
flesh, but (Aristotle) did not clarify (there) that the essence of things is
necessarily that the principle is other than the six principles this man used
to posit, I mean the four elements he posited in the material mode, and the
love and enmity he posited in the mode of agent.
C2c [And his saying] “except that as I have
said of those who make the causes two, they differ in the latter cause, I mean
the thing from which is motion, in that some of them say that it is one;
others, two” is a self-explanatory statement, and with it he alludes
(respectively) to Anaxagoras, who used to posit mind alone as the mover, and to
Empedocles, who posited the mover as two, love and enmity. (back to top) (annotation)
#3,
Tafsīr 58.4-60.4, on 987a13-21[12]:
In the same way the Pythagoreans
have spoken of two principles, while they said as much that is peculiar to them
-- that they thought the bounded and the unbounded [and the one] [13]
were not natures of some other (things), such as fire or earth or some other of
this kind; rather, (for them) the unlimited itself and the one itself are the essence
of those (things) to which they are assigned, wherefore also number is the
essence of all (things). About these (issues), then, they proclaimed in
this way, and they began to speak of and define “what is.”
T3 The Pythagoreans said that the
principles were two essentially in this mode, and this was manifest for them,
but then they distinguish it with doctrine on the limited and the one and the
unlimited, and their practice did not entail naming another thing, a nature
like fire or earth or what is more like that; rather, (for them) the unlimited
itself and the one in its essence are substance, and by these (considerations),
then, they come to posit them and to enumerate them. [In the Greek (there is)
some white (space)].
C3a [He says] that the Pythagoreans agreed
with the physicists on their statement that the principles were two only, but
in accordance with the way it appeared to them, not in accordance with the way
it appeared to the physicists that they were two. He only says that because their statement on
the nature of this two-fold (disposition) was not the statement of the latter
on it.
C3b And by way of what he mentions of what
these two parties subscribe to, and they are only two, he mentions what
characterizes (the Pythagoreans), [and so says] “but then they distinguish it
with doctrine on the limited and the one and the unlimited.” [He means] that what the Pythagoreans
distinguish with it is that they make these two-fold: one principle, the
limited and the one, they designate as one meaning; while the second principle
is the unlimited. According to them
these are two-fold in the mode of matter and form, not in the mode of matter
and agent as it was for the older of the physicists.
C3c [Then he says] “and their practice did not
entail naming another thing, a nature like fire or earth or what is more like
that; rather, (for them) the unlimited itself and the one in its essence are
substance.” [He means] that these people
did not attribute a natural basis to natural affairs,[14] I mean moving affairs, when they
made these two principles common to all natural existents, as did the
physicists in making the principle of natural affairs a natural principle like
fire or earth. By this he simply
indicates their failure in not positing a natural principle for natural things.
C3d They only posited these two principles of
things, whence they held that the two were the principles of number, that
number was the substance of natural things, and that the principles of
substance were (themselves) a substance; and this is what he indicates [with
his (just quoted) saying] “rather, (for them) the unlimited itself and the one
in its essence are substance.” [He
means] that, rather, they made only the unlimited itself and the one in its
essence principle(s) of existents, whence they were substance, and whence it
was that these two principles were substance also by being the principle of
number, which was the substance of existents.
That is to say, (for them) the principle of substance is necessarily
(itself) a substance.
C3e [And his saying] “and by these
(considerations), then, they come to posit them and to enumerate them” [means]
that they have made existents from these two principles that they say are
number, meaning that since they believed that existents were number and that
the principles of numbers were the one and the many, they said that these two
(magnitudes) were the principles of existents.
(back to top) (annotation)
#4,
Tafsīr 60.5-62.14, on 987a21-28 (concluding Chapter 5):
(The Pythagoreans began to do
that) but they worked it out too
simply. For they defined superficially,
and they named the first (example) to which the stated definition belonged as
the substance of the thing, just as if one thought double and the number two
were the same because double belongs first to the number two. But it
is not really the same to be double and two; otherwise many would be one, which
indeed followed for them. So much, then,
is to be grasped from the first (philosophers) [and the others].[15]
T4 (The Pythagoreans) employed
much[16]
simple reflection in their demarcation of the perceptible, and the first
existent [in the definition][17] was what they kept in mind; and what they used to suppose was that the
substance of the issue is like a person supposing that double and two-ness are
one thing in essence, because double is prior to two-ness; nonetheless, it is
not so in the aspect in which, if something is double, then due to that it is
two in essence; for if that were not so one would be many, and this is what
happened for them. Other things like
this might be found from the foregoing and later.[18]
C4a [His saying] “and they employed much
simple reflection in their demarcation of the perceptible, and the first
existent [in the definition] was what they kept in mind” [means] that, since
they wanted to consider existents, these people, meaning the Pythagoreans, made
their consideration of them too simple as soon as they demarcated the first
existent, that is, the worthiest of (existents) in existence, to be that which
they most knew. (To them) knowledge,
that is, substance, was by definition what they recalled, that is, in their
statement that (substance) is one and unlimited and that it is number.
C4b [Then he says] “and what they used to suppose was that the substance of a thing is like
a person supposing that double and two-ness are one thing in essence, because
double is prior to two-ness; nonetheless, it is not so in the aspect in which,
if something is double, then due to that it is two in essence.” [He means] that their view that the nature of
existents is the nature of number, by means of numbers being ascribed to
existents and being portrayed in them, is like the view of one who believes
that double and two-ness are one thing in essence, that is, of one nature, by
means of double being more general that two-ness and naturally prior to
it. That is, what is prescribed is something which, when it
disappears, the other disappears, but when the other disappears it does not
disappear, while when the other exists it exists.
C4c [Then he says (as just quoted)] “nonetheless, it is not so in the aspect in
which, if something is double, then due to that it is two in essence.” [He means] that, nonetheless, the mode in
which a thing is a double is not the mode where it is two; meaning that,
(given) one thing in itself, when it proves correct that more than one (thing)
is ascribed to it, it is not entailed that the correctness be in the same mode,
so that both would be one thing, nor that the ascription distinguish the
substance of the thing.
C4d [Then he says] “and if that were not so one would be many.” [He means] that if the nature of the latter
thing is not different from the nature of the former, the nature of one and the
nature of plurality are the same, or plurality is predicated of one. He only means by this that if existents are
numbers by means of number being prior to existents, then many is one; and one,
many.
C4e [And his saying] “and this is what happened
for them” [means] that the absurdity of one holding that existents are number
is like the absurdity of one holding that one is many, that is, that opposites
are the same by their being in one thing.
C4f [And his saying] “And other things similar to this might be found from the foregoing and
later” [means] that many things might be found from matters being prior
according to the senses in this way of priority, having this meaning by degree
of number; and then a substance is not naturally distinguished by being number
without the rest of things being prior according to (this way of
priority). All this goes back to
“foregoing” in the definition not necessarily being some previous thing in
existence. We will explain this more in
the treatises on substance (coming later in the Tafsīr).
(back to top) (annotation)
#5,
Tafsīr 62.15-65.4, on 987a29-b2 (beginning Chapter 6):
After the cited philosophies ensued the study of Plato, greatly
following them[19] but also having its peculiarity in relation
to the Italian philosophy. For in his
youth he became well acquainted first with Cratylus and the Heraclitian
opinions,[20] how all the senses are always flowing, and
knowledge of them is not substantial, and thus he also retained these
(opinions) later. And Socrates was
concerned with ethics, while not at all with nature; (rather, he sought the general in
[ethics], and was the first to fix thought on their definitions.)[21]
T5 And after what has been cited of types
of philosophy the philosophy of Plato arose, and for the most part it followed
them, and as to details[22]
his philosophy was in accordance with the opinion of the Italians. First was what happened after Democritus:[23]
the opinions of the Heracliteans that all existents are continually flowing and
that there is no science of them, and upon this (encounter) he accepted these
opinions in the sequel. And then
Socrates only spoke on moral practices, and did not talk at all of anything in
nature.[24] [In the Greek there is a lacuna or blank.]
C5a [He says] that the philosophy of Plato
arose after what arose of these kinds of philosophy, [that is,] after the
philosophy of adherents of numbers, who were the partisans of Pythagoras and in
general those who made mathematics the principle(s?)[25]
of existing concerns, and after the philosophy of the physicists, who were the
partisans of Anaxagoras, the partisans of Empedocles, and the partisans of
Democritus.
C5b [And his saying] on the philosophy of
Plato, that “for the most part it followed them,” [is] that in most of his opinions on
existents Plato follows the orientation of the adherents of numbers, that is, the
Pythagoreans and any who approximate them, at least the associates of the
Italians, and they are what is known today for the realm of Europe and there
(in Italy). And God knows[26]
the first physicists were Anaxagoras and his partisans and Empedocles and his
partisans and Democritus and his partisans.
(Aristotle) says that in most of his philosophy Plato follows those who
made mathematics the reasons for sensory subjects, or sensory subjects in
themselves, only because Plato used to support forms and to hold that the
nature of forms and the nature of numbers were the same, on which we will
expound in the treatises of this science on substance.[27]
He was wont to hold that the four elements were composites of the sides
and angles of equal surfaces, and these are the five bodies cited in the last
book of
C5c [And his saying] “but first was what
happened after so-and-so,” [that is,] a man of the adherents of natural
science: “the Heraclitean opinions.”
They (i.e., presumably the holders of these opinions)[28]
were those who were skeptical of all who were engaged in philosophy at that
time, and so said that there was no science there, because science is necessary
and eternal, while nothing there pertains to science except sensory things, and
they are always changing; and surely when (something) is always changing the science
of it is always changing; but changeable science is not science. So there was no science there (in their
opinion).
C5d [Then he says] “and upon this (encounter)
he accepted these opinions in the sequel.”
[He means] that these opinions we have cited, then, are those that
investigators got to in philosophy, meaning up to (Plato’s) time.
C5e And since he has brought in no account of
Socrates, and he was one of the well-known sages, [(Aristotle) says] “and then
Socrates only spoke on moral practices, and did not talk at all of anything in
nature.” [He means] that he was the
first to speak on ethical philosophy, and did not add anything to what anyone
who preceded him had said on scientific philosophy. (back to top) (annotation)
#6,
Tafsīr 65.5-70.5, on 987b4-19:
(Since Socrates did that,) then,
accepting such as was according to this(?),[29](Plato)
took up this (generality) as being about other things, and not about the
senses; for a common delineation of any of the sensible things is impossible
with them always changing. Thus, then,
he referred to things of this sort as ideas,[30]
saying that sensory things were entirely apart from them and named for them;[31] for <the many synonyms>[32]
are homonyms of the forms by participation.
He only changed the name, to “participation,” for the Pythagoreans say
entities are (themselves) by imitation of numbers, but Plato by participation,
changing the name. But the
participation or imitation of the forms (itself) is common (to both) in being
left out of the investigation. Moreover,
besides sensory things and forms, he says the mathematical of subjects are
intermediate, differing from sensory things in being eternal and motionless,
and from forms in being similar to many while the form itself is only one
each. And since (to him) the forms were
the causes of the other things, (he thought their elements were the elements of
all beings.)[33]
T6 (And ?)[34]
(Plato) approved that because he inferred that the being of this (concern of
Socrates?)[35]
was in the pattern of the being of the rest of things, while nothing in sensory
things is fixed, nor as well is it possible for there to be a definition in
which sensory things participate, since they are endlessly
altering. He called those (aspects) of existents that were in
essence the same forms,[36] while (for him) all the sense
impressions are only said to be of[37]
these (forms) and on account of them; and the many agreeing in name are common
in species,[38]
except that he added participation in the name.
The Pythagoreans said that existents were numbers in the mode of
comparison, but Plato added participation in the name, and then they neglected
general investigation into what the participation or comparison among species
was. They were only opposed on sensory
things and mathematical species, which they say are intermediate between
subjects:[39]
either the senses, and some of them are always unmoving, or the species, and
they are what exists for many, and the (individual abstract) species is an
existing thing that is the same for all.
Also, the species is the cause of the other things. [Here is a lacuna in the Greek.][40]
C6a Since doubting the Heracliteans was what
moved Plato to the doctrine on the forms he embraced, in this section
(Aristotle) takes up -- and God knows (this) -- relating how it moved him to
that (doctrine) to the point of making it necessary for him to be convinced of
the forms. [(Aristotle’s saying] “(he
approved that) because he inferred that the being of this was in the pattern of
the being of the rest of things, while nothing in sensory things is fixed”
[probably means] that it moved Plato to the doctrine and the forms by the
example, only in that he found in each genus, and in each species, that the
being of the individual referring to (the species) in that (genus) was on the
model of the being of the rest of the individuals in that genus without the
affair failing, and that it was impossible for this to arise by accident. He held that “nothing in sensory things is
fixed, nor as well is it possible for there to be a definition in which sensory
things participate, since they are endlessly altering.”[41]
He held that meanings existing for the individuals of each species were
the same in essence, and that definitions of things were concerns necessarily
outside of the mind, and he called them forms and models. That is, they are forms for sensory things,
while models for nature have them in view, just as the manufacturer has the
form of the manufactured in view; or else a thing would not agree with what the
thing agreed with: a human would not always come from the sperm of a human, nor
always a horse from the sperm of a horse.
C6b [Then he says] “while (for Plato) all the
sense impressions, are only said to be of these (just cited forms and models?)[42]
and on account of them.” [He means] that
they (i.e. the followers of Plato) hold instead of this (i.e., that horse and
human would be conflated) that all sensory things are only delimited by this
nature, and only exist on account of it, just as a thing exists by means of its
model; that is, their arrangement and coherence only exist on account of the
model.
C6c [His saying] “and the many agreeing in
name are common in species, except that he added participation in the name”
[means] except that the agreed-upon names are what indicate one common meaning
of many things, while as to the (just prior) statement on forms, there is no
one common meaning for the pluralities here; and then the names of the species
entail being common, and then there is no general meaning there, only the
wording, and thus [he says] “except that he added participation in the name.”
C6d [Then he says] “the Pythagoreans said that
existents were numbers in the mode of comparison, but Plato added participation
in the name.” [He means] then that the
impetus of the Pythagoreans to holding that existents were numbers was only
that they likened numbers to existents and then held that existents were them
in themselves; and so for them the existence of a common name between numbers
and existents was not required, nor did the impetus to their doctrine (require)
adding a common name for species. But
Plato added the common name, or persisted in holding it.
C6e And in this (Aristotle) probably only
refers to some of the ancients having held that the causes of existents were
universal genera like the one and the existent, not that they held that there
was a common name here. Hence Parmenides
erred as soon as he did not distinguish between the name of the existent
indicating one in number and indicating one in genus, and so held that the
entire existent was one in number.
C6f [Then he says] “and then they neglected
investigation into what the participation and comparison among species
was.” In this he points to Plato, that
is to say, in that the investigation of the participation that is among
individuals neglected participation among species, while it had been incumbent
on him to investigate participation among species. (Aristotle) only says that because it is
contingent that when (Plato) says the ultimate species are forms, he (must)
speak like that on the remaining species, and then there are forms of forms,
and that passes to infinity; otherwise, he (would have to) say that all species
are mental things, existing in the mind, not that existence for them is outside
the mind.
C6g [His saying] “and they were only opposed
on sensory things and mathematical species, which they say are intermediate
between subjects” [means] that the reason that they only contemplated the
nature of species, and did not contemplate the nature of genera, was that their
appraisal was only by way of opposition, not by way of research into what
species are. Therefore, since the people
(i.e., the Platonists) opposed the Heraclitean doubt about science arising from
sensory things and from things which concern sensory things, while they said
mathematics was in the forms, and was by nature intermediate between forms and
sensory things, truly for them the mistrust in both subjects was dissolved
altogether by this statement. If they perceived the subject by
reckoning its nature the response would be the same for sensory things and
mathematics.
C6h And since all this opposition was unsound,
he cites the proper opposition with which one ought to oppose (the
Heracliteans), [and so says] “(mathematics is intermediate between subjects,)
either the senses, and some of them are always unmoving, or the species, and
they are what exists for many, and the (individual abstract) species is an
existing thing that is the same for all.
Also, the species is the cause of the other things.” [He means] that their statement that the
senses are not always in alteration is healthy opposition if it is said by them
that there is something in sensory existents that is not variable in its
essence, but rather is fixed: the form, while what eternally alters in them is
the matter.
C6i [And as to his (already cited) saying]
“or the species, and they are what exists for many, and the (individual
abstract) species is an existing thing that is the same for all,” he only says
it in opposition to the doctrine of the forms and in opposition to those who
say there is nothing here that individuals share except the name alone, i.e.,
the abolishers of science. That is to
say, when it is apparent from the definition of species that the meaning of the
existent for multitudes, in the mode that each (multitude) is existent, is in
number, then it is apparent that it is impossible for the abstracted forms to
be existent for sensory things by being (the latter), let alone for there to be
knowledge of their existence and of their quiddities.[43]
Similarly, it is apparent from this definition that the majority of what
have species predicated of them share the same meaning, not (just) the same
expression.
C6k [And as to his (already cited) saying]
“and the species is the cause of the other things,” or a cause of some other
things, by it [he only] intends the cause of the knowledge of individuals, not
the cause of the individuals. (back to top) (annotation)
#7,
Tafsīr 70.6-71.15, on 987b21-25:
(As matter, then, the great and the
small were principles; and as substance, the one.)[44] For out of those (i.e., the great and the
small),)[45]
by participation in the one, are forms and numbers (?).[46]
Thus, now, in saying that the one is substance rather than something else that is
said to be one, (Plato) spoke close beside the Pythagoreans, and in like manner
to them on numbers being the causes of the substances of other things.
T7 Then species are what are from those (?)[47]
in the mode of participation in the one, and then one who says that the one is
substance, and is not another existing thing said to be one, has nearly spoken
the doctrine of the Pythagoreans that numbers are the cause of the substance of
other things, for this is their opinion.
C7a [(As to) his saying] “then the species is[48]
what are from those in the mode of participation in the one,” [he probably
means] by this the distinction between individual and species, while [his
saying] “and what are from those” is an allusion to the individuals, as if to
say that the one meaning in the things cited for them in a mode whereby they do
not contribute to it, but rather it singles out each unity from them, is the
individual unity, while the one meaning that exists in common with them is
called the species.
C7b [His saying] “and then one who says that
the one is substance, and is not another existing thing said to be one, has
nearly spoken the doctrine of the Pythagoreans” [means] that one who says that
the one in number is substance, not another thing existing here that is said to
be one in another way, not one in number, has nearly spoken the doctrine of the
Pythagoreans, “that numbers are the cause of the substance of other things.”[49]
He only [says] “nearly” because they (i.e., the Platonists) were
enamored of the undivided part, for according to them these (numbers) are not
substance or one except as this part.
And then impossibilities adhere to them that adhere to anyone who says
that the substances of things are numbers (i.e., like the Pythagoreans); that
is to say, neither faction has been able to say how any contiguity arises from
these (substances or numbers), nor how this “one” is an undivided cause of
effect and action and transformation.
For if an alteration is obtained it is a composite of matter and form,
while every composite of matter and form is divisible. And all this was explained in (Aristotle’s
works on) natural science.[50]
(back to top) (annotation)
#8,
Tafsīr 71.16-75.3, on 987b25-988a2:
But instead of the unlimited as
one (Plato) made the dyad: the unlimited from great and small, this being
peculiar (to him). Moreover, he (made) the numbers apart from sense
perceptions, while (the Pythagoreans) say the numbers themselves are things and
do not put mathematical things between them.
Then this making the one and the numbers apart from things, not like the
Pythagoreans, and the introduction of forms, were generated from investigation
by reasoning -- for the first (philosophers) did not partake of dialectic --
while making the other nature a dyad was according to the numbers except the
primes(?)[51]
being generated from it naturally, like from some template.[52] Nevertheless, what ensues is the opposite;
for this is not reasonable. For they
make many (things) from matter, ….
T8 Of them (i.e., presumably the
combination of Platonists and Pythagoreans) some made two instead of the
unlimited a unity, and some of them made the unlimited from the great and the
small, and this then was characteristic (of them), and some of them made
numbers from[53]
sensory things, and some of them said these affairs (i.e., the sensory things)
were numbers,[54]
not putting mathematical things between them. And then those who made the one and the
numbers something other than (sensory?)[55]
affairs, not like what the Pythagoreans did, only arrive at species by
investigating according to definitions, while there was no art of debate with
the earlier (thinkers). And those who
made the other nature twofold by means of the numbers except the primes
originating from it as a natural issuance, just as a thing originates from a
thing resembling it, are in opposition to what happens. And then holding these (numbers) to be from
matter proceeds correctly. [In the Greek
(here is) a gap of about half a page.]
C8a He says that of those who made the
principles two, the one and the unlimited, some of them made the unlimited
generated from two-ness; they did not make two-ness an
opposition (i.e., of members of a pair) like those who made it from the great
and the small, and that is what he indicates [with his saying] “(they made
two instead of the unlimited) some unity” [that is,] they did not make (the
two-ness) a two-ness.
C8b [Then he says] “and some of them made the
cause of the unlimited the great and the small, and this then was
characteristic (of them).” [He means]
that some of them made the cause of the unlimited the two-ness that is the
great and the small, both of which pass in (their) magnitudes to infinity; and
he only [says] “and this then was characteristic (of them)” because they made
three principles for what the ancients had agreed were two opposites, on the
one hand the great and the small, and on the other the substratum[56] that admits the two, which is one;
and those who made the principles the one and the unlimited, generated from
two-ness, did not in the least make the one and the unlimited a substratum of
the two opposites.
C8c [His saying] “and some of them made
numbers from sensory things, and some of them said these affairs were numbers”
[means] that of those who said that the principles were numbers, some made
numbers a component of sensory things, that is, forms for them, and they were
the adherents of forms and numbers, while some of them, namely, the
Pythagoreans, said the sensory things were themselves numbers.
C8d Since among the holders of the forms some
made numbers, and in general the subject[57]
of mathematics, natures intermediate between forms and sensory things, while
the Pythagoreans were not holding either of the two statements (i.e., neither
that numbers were intermediate nor that mathematics was intermediate), but were
only wont to say that numbers as a whole were that from which existents were
composed, [he says] right after (speaking) on their statement, “they do not put
mathematical things between them (i.e., sensory things).” Probably he only says this on the authority
of those who say numbers are forms; that is to say, these (people of whom we
have been speaking) are two groups: some of them say that numbers and forms are
of the same nature, while others of them say that the nature of numbers is
other than the nature of forms, and is a nature intermediate between forms and
sensory things, according to what he relates of the ancients in the
thirteenth(?) (essay) of this book.[58]
C8e [Then he says] “and then those who made
the one and the numbers from (sensory?) affairs, not like what the Pythagoreans
did, only arrive at species by investigating according to definitions.” [He
means] that those who made the one and numbers a component of sensory affairs,
that is, a formal component, and did not say number was itself the existents as
did the Pythagoreans, only arrived at the doctrine of forms and the doctrine
that they were (i.e., included) numbers by means of their investigation
according to the nature of definitions, I mean from where in them form
comes. Things (that are attempted to be)
defined outside of the mind are variable, and then according to them that makes
it necessary to make the locus of definitions, or definitions in themselves,
forms, and according to them makes necessary the situation of the forms being
in these (things), I mean their being an abstraction(?)[59] of (plural) matter,[60]
lest their nature be other than the nature of number. That is to
say, if the forms exist it is not possible for their nature to be other than
the nature of number.
C8f [Then he says] “and those who made the
other nature twofold by means of the numbers except the primes originating
from it as a natural issuance, just as a thing originates from a thing
resembling it, are in opposition to what happens. And then holding these (numbers) to be from
matter proceeds correctly.” [He means]
that those who posit the twofold as being of the nature of matter, not of the
nature of forms, by means of the undistinguished numbers being generated from
it as a natural issuance, just as a thing is generated from what it resembles,
and that it is the cause of the unlimited, have
spoken correctly, because if this were an accidental affair of the two-ness
this action would not always be found, because what is found of the thing by
accident is contrary to this, I mean it rarely happens to the thing.
C8g And this is what he
indicates [in his (already cited) saying] “that is in
opposition to what happens.”[61]
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