Averroës Comment #	on Bekker pages	Averroës Comment #	on Bekker pages	Averroës Comment #	on Bekker pages	Averroës Comment #	on Bekker pages
17	989b6-13	18	989b13-29	19	989b29-990a6	20	990a6-10
21	990a10-18	22	990a18-22	23	990a22-29	24	990a29-34

 

#17, Tafsīr 96.1-98.8, on 989b6-13:

            For when nothing was distinguished, clearly there was thus nothing true to be said about the substance of that (mixture), I mean [for example][1] that it was neither white nor black -- or gray or other color, but was necessarily colorless, for (otherwise) it would have something of these colors, and similarly by this same argument it was also flavorless, nor was there anything of other similar qualities; for neither was it any manner of such a thing nor any amount of it nor anything definite. For then something of the said forms would have belonged to it; and this is impossible  (under conditions stated next)

T17      And then if a thing was not originally distinguished, that shows that it is incorrect for that substance to be said to have been in one state or another then;[2] I mean that it was not in a white (state), nor black or blackish[3] or other color, but was necessarily in no color and was deprived[4] of all these colors; and similarly it did not possess any of the components (of the mixture), and therefore in essence there was nothing in it of the mutually resembling parts,[5] nor is it presumed that it possessed any quality, nor any quantity nor any other thing at all, because what is said about a thing of parts is that they are species of it, and that is not a possibility [(in the Greek there is) a blank].

C17a   [He says] and then the showing that it is not necessary for one thing or another to actually have been generated from that from which becoming occurred in the beginning, and (which) is a principle in the material mode, shows thereby that it was not necessary for what was generated then from that beginning to have been in one aspect or another; because if all substantial and accidental aspects were being generated from it and the generated was not arising from what was existent, but from what was nonexistent, then it is clear that it is necessary for this beginning not to have been in any of the aspects, neither by way of accidental qualities nor of substantial (ones), nor by way of quantity.  (This is) because if something were characterized by one of (these means) then that thing would have been existent before being generated, and it is clear that nothing is generated except what was nonexistent.

C17b   And therefore it is necessary, as he says, for all colors to have been withheld from (the original entity), and all forms to have been withheld, and that is what he indicates [with his saying] “and similarly it did not possess any of the components,” [that is,] there was no intermingling of any of the natures, and therefore as he says, “there was nothing in it of the bodies of mutually resembling parts.”

C17c   [And his saying] “nor is it presumed that it possessed any quality, nor any quantity nor any other thing at all, because what is said about a thing of parts is that they are species of it, and that is not a possibility” [means] that it is also impossible to think of (the undistinguished initial substance’s) predication proving true with any existing thing, like proving true of it that it possesses quality or quantity or something else of the genera of existents, because if that were so there would be a genus of existents by which its predication proved true, and if that were so these existents would be species and the genus would be of them.

C17d   And he only says that because clearly, or from what will be made clear later, genus is not matter; that is to say, genus is general form, while matter is of a mode where it is not necessary for a thing in (that mode) actually to belong to that which receives (the thing). And then the possessor is not form at all, be it general or particular; rather, it only receives the general form or not, and then receives the general form of the remaining forms via mediation, down to the individual forms, and is one in number in the mode of the substrate[6] of the many individual forms, in forms in the mode that is distributed in them.  (Matter) in general resembles genus, except that it differs from genus by being one in number out of a great many in the mode that its existence is potential, while genus is one in the intermediate form between actual and potential in a great many. Therefore it proves true that genus is predicated of many species and of individuals of these species, while it does not prove true of matter: it is predicated neither of species engendered from it nor of its particulars. The ancients like Alexander wrote work on genus not being matter, and some of that account will be reached in these essays. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#18, Tafsīr 98.9-101.8, on 989b13-29:[7]

             (that is impossible) with all being mixed, for it would already be separated out, while (Anaxagoras) says all is mixed except mind, which alone is unmixed and pure. From these things, then, it falls to him to say that the principles are the one -- for this is simple and unmixed -- and another, of the sort we make indeterminate before it is defined and participates in some form. So he speaks neither correctly nor clearly, but nonetheless intends something akin to what was said later and to what now appears more.[8] But these people turn out to be familiar only with arguments on genesis and destruction and motion, for they are close to only seeking the principles and causes of such essences; while the sort who effect investigation of all being, positing the sensible of entities and the not sensible, clearly make inquiry into both kinds. Therefore one might spend more time on them, and we now set forth what they say rightly or not rightly in their examination.

T18      All things are mixed, and then (Anaxagoras?) responds (that they were?) at that time (i.e., presumably, at the beginning),[9] and (Anaxagoras) says that all things are mixed, excepting mind, and that it alone is pure (and) unmixed. And then it is contingent from these things for him to say of the principles that they are at some point[10] one and that it is simple and unmixed, like what we posit as indeterminate before being defined and restricted to some species. And then one who holds the latter doctrine or something close to it does not state a correct or clear account, especially those whom we have now cited. However, these doctrines are only suitable for discussion of becoming and decaying and motion alone, and (for that) this investigation of this substance and principles and causes suffices. (But) one who applies thought to all existents says that some existents are sensory and some of them non-sensory; and it is clear that this is the way that they pose their investigation of both genera. Therefore if an aspirant intends to explore what they say in order to discern whether what they say is right or wrong, that can be done from the study we will now investigate.

C18a   [His saying] “and then it is contingent from these things for him to say of the principles that they are at some point one and that it is simple and unmixed” [means] then that from what we say for (Anaxagoras) it is contingent to say of the principles that at some point they are indeterminate, and at another point that they are determinate: indeterminate and potential by virtue of their not coming to be if they are not like that, but determinate by virtue of generation from them not being a determination (whereas, implicitly, it must be) if they are not determined (so that they must be).

C18b   [Then he says] “and then one who holds the latter doctrine or something close to it does not state a correct or clear account.” [He means] about this, then, that one who holds the latter doctrine, namely, that the element and principle is actually an existent within the nature of things of which it is a principle, has not spoken a correct statement, alluding by that to all of (those who held this position), because none of them posited the material principle as something free of the things which are generated from it; and then there is no coming to be there, because coming to be is only from what is potential, not from what is actual.

C18c   [And his saying] “in particular those whom we have now cited,” alludes to Empedocles, since he used to posit that the elements were actual and that none of them changed into another.

C18d   And since investigation of the elements of moving affairs is characteristic of natural science, and consideration of them here is only insofar as they are principles of substances existing in themselves, and in relation to them he has only given a nature-based account here, [he says] “however, these doctrines are only suitable for discussion of becoming and decaying and motion alone, and (for that) this investigation of this substance and principles and causes suffices.” [He means] that proper discussion conforming to this basis is discussion taken from natural affairs, and the non-detailed inquiry we have pursued into this basis here suffices here, in accordance with what this consideration offers.

C18e[11]            And by saying this he wants the need recognized to urge the division of this consideration according to some people, i.e., that the two sciences are not one science, given that many people used to presume that natural and divine science were one thing in essence. [And then he says] “and one who applies thought to all existents says that some existents are sensory and some of them non-sensory; and it is clear that this is the way that they pose their investigation of both genera.” [He means] that according to (some) people among the ancients existents were divided into two classes, sensory and non-sensory; for since they put their focus on the two genera into making them one genus, discussion related to them is characteristic of this science (i.e., metaphysics), and they wee those who made mathematics the rationale of the principle of sensory affairs.

C18f    [Then he says] “therefore if an aspirant intends to explore what they say in order to discern whether what they say is right or wrong, that can be done from the study we will now investigate.” [He means] that because this position in this science is characteristic in relation to them, one who wishes to attend to whether their statement is right or wrong can do that from the study we will now explore, and from these doctrines and arguments that we (will) look into. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#19, Tafsīr 101.9-104.13, on 989b29-990a6:

            Now those called Pythagoreans employ principles and elements more remote than those of the naturalists. (Parenthetically,) the reason is that they did not receive these from sense impressions; for the mathematical of beings are without motion except those concerning astronomy.  Nonetheless they entirely converse about, and busy themselves with nature; for they produce the sky and watch closely the events of its parts and affects and workings, and they expend principles and causes on these, as if agreeing with the others, the physicists, that what is being is such as this sense impression and what is called the sky encloses it. The causes and principles, as we say, they say 

T19      What the Pythagoreans appeal to is that they employ (for) principles and elements a usage departing from what the spokesmen of natural science employ; and the reason for that is that they did not get these causes[12] from sensory things; for the mathematical affairs of existents are without motion save what of them is in astronomy. They argue continually and speak about nature, and they are pleased by what is perceived of the sky and its parts and actions and effects and the accompaniments of these (effects only?),[13] and they force principles and causes on them so that they are counted as natural scientists by us; for only what is sensory of existents arises (for these people), and they accept the thing called sky; and on causes and principles they make many statements of which we have spoken.

C19a   Since he recognizes that in this study the human is able to grasp the error of those who confuse two genera of existents, I mean the sensory and the mental, in that they make the mental a cause of the sensory, he takes up the elucidation of that (error), [and so says] “what the Pythagoreans appeal to is that they employ (for) principles and elements a usage departing from what the spokesmen of natural science employ.” [He means] that the partisans of Pythagoras make things that are unsuitable and improper for natural affairs the causes of natural affairs.

C19b   [Then he says] “and the reason for that (departure from the naturalists) is that they did not get these things from sensory things; for the mathematical affairs of existing affairs are without motion save what of them is in astronomy.” [He means] that the reason for their making unsuitable principles for natural affairs is that they did not seek sensory principles from where these were sensory and moving, but only sought their principles from unmoving affairs, i.e., the mathematical; for in them there is no motion going beyond the science of form (i.e., astronomy),[14] while the prin-ci-ples of moving affairs are necessarily other than the principles of non-moving affairs.

C19c   And you ought to know that (Aristotle is) a follower of the science of form, and that its subjects are moving and are the heavenly bodies; for it does not examine their nature in the mode of what is in motion, but only deliberates about their figures and their compositions in the mode of the manners of their motions, and in the mode of their speed and their slowness, and it also deliberates about their magnitudes, while the follower of natural science deliberates about their natures with respect to being in motion, and distinguishes what kind of motions is permitted from what is not permitted.

C19d   [Then he says] “they argue continually and speak about nature, and they are awed by what is perceived of the sky and its parts and actions and effects and the accompaniments of these, and they force principles and causes on them so that they are counted as natural scientists by us [ to the end ] what we have written.” [He means] that, although they employ a principle not of nature in natural affairs, the Pythagoreans wish to imitate natural scientists; and so they pronounce on nature and on all that is visible of heavenly motions and their parts according to the mode in which the followers of natural science speak of them, and on the actions and the effects that are visible in things under the sky, while they wish to give their reasoning on all this in the mode of mathematical affairs, that is, numbers.

C19e   [And his saying] “so that they are counted by us as natural scientists; for only what is sensory of existents arises (for these people)” [means] that they only used to pronounce on these things in order to be counted among the spokesmen on nature, because they avowed that existing affairs were sensory and that non-sensory things were there, I mean that (they said) the principles of sensory affairs were substances separate (from them), just as many in ancient times used to think.

C19f    [And his saying] (on) the account from them “and they accept the thing called sky; and on the causes and the principles they make many statements” [means] that they used to make the sky of the nature of the affairs that are under the sky, and to expound many teachings on the causes of what is visible in it. With this he only points to what is to be credited to their having made numerical species the cause of existents, such as that they would make the member of a pair a cause of those existents of which there happens to be a member of a pair, and make solitary things a cause of those things of which there happen to be solitary things, (or) such as that they made third a cause of all existents of which it happens that there are three, and like that fourth and fifth. For this opinion was handed down from these people, and was famous.

C19g   And what he had said in the places which permeate what preceded in this book is similar, and therefore [he says] “of which we have spoken.” (back to top) (annotation)

 

#20, Tafsīr 104.14-105.13, on 990a6-10:

            (They say the causes and principles) are sufficient to go up even to the higher of beings, and these do fit better (there) than their accounts of nature. Nonetheless, they say nothing on by what means there will be motion when only limited and unlimited and odd and even are supposed

T20      And then let us ascend to the higher of existents, and to the property of what of them speech on nature fits; then we say that in one way or another the motion of some of them is a bounded essence and of others an unbounded essence, while (the Pythagoreans) say nothing on substrate[15] and paired and single.[16]

C20a   Since all the ancients had agreed that the principles were contraries, and the partisans of Pythagoras were those who hold existents to be numbers, they thought that contrariness is the principle of number, i.e., limit and the absence of limit, commencing their opposition[17] in this mode. Then he says that for them these two contraries exist in motion, and then it is contingent that motion is numbers.

C20b   Since the entire two contraries have need of a substrate of them, and since of what (the Pythagoreans) said on limit and the absence of limit they did not say what the substrate of the two was, [he says] “while they say nothing on substrate.”

C20c   And since the contraries that exist in numbers are the paired and the single, and it is more suitable for one who holds that numbers are composed of contraries to hold that these contraries are paired and single, [he says] “while they say nothing on substrate and paired and single.” (back to top) (annotation)

 

#21, Tafsīr 105.14-107.15, on 990a10-18:

            (They say nothing on that)  nor on how genesis and decay, or action by things borne through the sky, are possible without motion and change. More, if either one granted them that there is magnitude from these things, or this were demonstrated, nonetheless in what way will some bodies possess lightness but others weight? For on the basis of what they assume and say, they speak no more on the mathematical of bodies than on the sensory; therefore they say nothing whatsoever on fire or earth or the others of such bodies, I suppose because they say nothing on sensory things in their particularity.

T21      And how is it possible for there to be becoming and decaying without motion or change or the diverse actions from heaven? And if it is conceded to them or becomes clear that there is magnitude from these things, then in what way is it thought to arise? For some bodies are light and others are heavy, except that what they posit and say is that this is not a primary thing for (the bodies), but that there are mathematical and sensory bodies.[18] So therefore they did not speak of fire and of what resembles it of bodies, nor as well do I think that for sensory things they give a proper account.[19]

C21a   [He means] that when things are numbers no motion is there at all, and that when there is neither motion nor change nor various heavenly motions, it is impossible for becoming or decaying to arise there.

C21b   [Then he says] “and if it is conceded to them or becomes clear that there is magnitude from these things, then in what way is it thought to arise?”  [He means] that within the impossibility that adheres to them, (this magnitude) is assembled from separated quantity, I mean that units that are not in contact and are not connected are a contiguous magnitude; however, if this (impossibility) is conceded to them or we assume that it is perhaps possible[20] for it to be shown, then in what way are these natural bodies diverse?

C21c   [Then he says] “for some bodies are light and others are heavy, except that what they posit and say is that this is not a primary thing for them, but that there are mathematical and sensory bodies.” [He means] that given the appearance that some sensory bodies are heavy and others are light, how is it possible for (the Pythagoreans) to produce the cause of heaviness and lightness along with (the statement) according to them (that) the heavy and the light body, and in general the sensory (body), and the mathematical body are the same body in essence?

C21d   That is to say, they do not posit that mathematical bodies are prior to substance and definition for sensory bodies, as do those who make mathematical bodies the principles of sensory bodies. For the latter say that bodies are of two sorts, mathematical and sensory, and that the mathematical is prior to the sensory in existence and definition, while they (i.e., the Pythagoreans) do not posit that some one of (these bodies) is prior to the second but do not (even) make them multiple, let alone some of them prior to others. Instead they posit that mathematical bodies, I mean those composed of numbers, are sen-sory things in essence; and then they are unable to produce the cause by means of which some (bodies) become heavy and others light, except (by claiming that) some of the mathematical existents are heavy and others are light. And all that is unseemly[21] and absurd.

C21e   And it only befalls them that they do not state any account proper to sensory things, by virtue of their departing from[22] offering the reasons[23] for things moving after not moving. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#22, Tafsīr 107.16-108.15, on 990a18-22:

            Besides, how must one understand the causes of what is and becomes in heaven to be the incidents of number or number (itself), both from the beginning and now, on the one hand, while (understanding) there to be no number from which the world is composed that is different from this number, on the other?

T22      And also, how ought we to understand the effects of numbers to be reasons and causes, and that the numbers of the sky are existent and characteristic both in eternity[24] and now, and that there is not some number other than this number from which the basis of the universe arises?

C22a   [He says] how is it possible for us to understand numerical effects like paired, single, etc. as a cause of effects in sensory things like whiteness, blackness, etc. among effects existing in natural bodies? For there is no relationship between effects of numbers and effects of natural existents, and if moving existents were a number it would necessarily find[25] the effects of numbers for them.

C22b   [And his saying] “and (how is it possible) that the numbers of the sky are existent and characteristic, both in eternity and now, and that there is not some number other than this number from which the basis of the universe arises?” [means] by what, then, do the numbers from which the sky (comes) differ from the numbers from which what is under the sky comes? For the nature of an existent characteristic of the sky is other than what there is for becoming-decaying,[26] since the sky exists eternally, that is, for all of the three durations: past, present and future, while becoming-decaying affairs are changeable. (But) according to (the Pythagoreans) the nature of the number from which the basis of the universe arises is in essence the same nature (as that of becoming-decaying affairs). (back to top) (annotation)

 

#23, Tafsīr 108.16-110.15, on 990a22-29:

            For whenever opinion is in a region of this (world) according to (the Pythagoreans), and due measure, and a little above or below injustice and separating[27] or mixing, and they say in their demonstration that each of these is a number, but it happens that there is already a quantity of magnitudes composed at this place because of their incidents ensuing for each of the places, then must the number for each of these (places or magnitudes) be understood as the same as that of heaven [or: then is the number that must be understood for each of these (places or magnitudes) the same as that of heaven],[28] or is it another (number) besides this?

T23      And then when (the Pythagoreans) have thought something that is an opinion of particulars is according to what they think, and say that what is above and below and injustice and mixing and separating is a demon-stration because each one[29] of these is a number, then it is contingent that magnitudes are formed in this way from many (numbers) because each one of the effects follows each one of the places; and then it is deemed(?)[30] (that) this number is that of the sky, and it or something close to it is necessarily to be held of every one of these (places).

C23a   [He means] that it is contingent of this opinion that knowledge of particulars is firmly unalterable, because number is unalterable, and then it is necessary for sensory things to be unchanged in their substance when they are number.

C23b   [And his saying] “and they say that what is above and below and injustice and mixing and separating is a demon-stration because each one of these is a number” [means] that the greater part of existents being paired, like top and bottom and the remaining contraries, indicates that existents are number.

C23c   And since he sets down that this (indication) is from their statement, [he says] “then it is contingent that magnitudes are formed in this way from many (numbers) because each one of the effects follows each one of the places; and then it is deemed (that) this number is that of the sky, and it or something close to it is necessarily to be held of every one of these.” [He means] that with this position it is contingent that all bodies are composed of numerically many (things), and then the nature of all of them is the same nature, and that the divisions of it and the effects occurring by its means differ in names and in the determinations that indicate them by names, so that some bodies are named sky and others water and others air and others fire, (and that the names’) acquisition by these bodies is only by means of places: a substantive division is not claimed for these places, but an affair to the contrary.

C23d[31]            And this is the ultimate in unseemliness; for it is contingent of this position that the same body in essence, possessing one nature in essence, when placed above is called sky, and is delimited by definition as the sky, and is eternal by means of place, while when below it is a becoming-decaying by means of place and is called fire or earth or air or water. All this is absurdly unseemly.

C23e   And since these things are unseemly they did not speak unequivocally about them, but rather they are contingent of their statements, (and) [he says] “it or something close to it is necessarily to be held of every one of these.” [He means] that this that is contingent of them, or close to it, is what must be held of each one of the bodies according to their doctrine. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#24, Tafsīr 110.16-112.8, on 990a29-34 (concluding Chapter 8 and beginning Chapter 9):

            For indeed Plato says (the already-generated number) is another (number than that of the sky); but he too thinks both these (magnitudes) and their causes are numbers, although mental ones for the causes and sensory ones for these. (Chap. 9) Let us now leave off this (discussion) about the Pythagoreans, for to touch on this much of them is sufficient.

(Preliminary comment by Averroës:)[32] And since this mode of unseemliness is not contingent of one who says that numbers are the principles of sensory existents through being forms for the latter, and (since) the determinations (by such thinkers) are not that they are sensory themselves like (the Pythagoreans) posit, [he says]:

T24      And then Plato says that it is another, because he thinks that these (magnitudes/bodies corresponding to the places) and their causes are numbers, but (the numbers for) the causes mental and (those for) these sensory. And then let us now leave off the doctrines of the Pythagoreans: we are content with what we have related of them.

C24a   [He says] and then Plato says that the number that is the cause(s?)[33] of the sensory is other than the number that is the sensory, because he thinks that the number that is the cause(s?) of sensory numbers is from sensory things, and that their formal causes are numbers. However, he says that the numbers that are causes are by nature mental, while the numbers of which they are causes are by nature sensory things.

C24b   And since (Aristotle) thinks that what he has said in response to the Pythagoreans is sufficient, and that after this he ought to begin the response to saying that numbers are causes of sensory things (i.e., rather than identical with them), [he says] “and then let us now leave off the doctrines of the Pythagoreans: we are content with what we have related of them.” And then the statement sets forth an expression of bidding himself to leave off what was his act in relating their opinions, and of contentment with (stating) their deviation on (the subject), due to our (i.e., Aristotle’s audience) obtaining assurance of the issue concerning (the subject) and (concerning) its necessity from that (discussion). For a person only bids him/herself to do what is within the design necessary for him/her, and then since the statement has set forth this expression, (Aristotle) has understood it to be within the necessary design. It is within the modes of collective ability[34] that all peoples are given to understand that, and therefore he begins in the book Prior Analytics, and speaks to conveying whence investigation is, and to what the thing for whose sake there is investigation is.

(back to top) (annotation) (comments 50-51)

 

 

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