Averroës
on Aristotle’s Criticism of his Predecessors:
An annotated translation of the long commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics A
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Comments 17-24
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Averroës Comment # |
on Bekker pages |
Averroës Comment # |
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Averroës Comment # |
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Averroës Comment # |
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989b6-13 |
989b13-29 |
989b29-990a6 |
990a6-10 |
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990a10-18 |
990a18-22 |
990a22-29 |
990a29-34 |
#17,
Tafsīr 96.1-98.8, on 989b6-13:
For when nothing was
distinguished, clearly there was thus nothing true to be said about the
substance of that (mixture), I mean [for example][1]
that it was neither white nor black -- or gray or other color, but was
necessarily colorless, for (otherwise) it would have something of these colors,
and similarly by this same argument it was also flavorless, nor was there
anything of other similar qualities; for neither was it any manner of such a
thing nor any amount of it nor anything definite. For then something of the said forms would
have belonged to it; and this is impossible … (under conditions stated next)
T17 And then if a thing was not originally
distinguished, that shows that it is incorrect for that substance to be said to
have been in one state or another then;[2]
I mean that it was not in a white (state), nor black or blackish[3]
or other color, but was necessarily in no color and was deprived[4]
of all these colors; and similarly it did not possess any of the components (of
the mixture), and therefore in essence there was nothing in it of the mutually
resembling parts,[5]
nor is it presumed that it possessed any quality, nor any quantity nor any other
thing at all, because what is said about a thing of parts is that they are
species of it, and that is not a possibility [(in the Greek there is) a blank].
C17a [He says] and then the showing that it is
not necessary for one thing or another to actually have been generated from
that from which becoming occurred in the beginning, and (which) is a principle
in the material mode, shows thereby that it was not necessary for what was
generated then from that beginning to have been in one aspect or another; because
if all substantial and accidental aspects were being generated from it and the
generated was not arising from what was existent, but from what was
nonexistent, then it is clear that it is necessary for this beginning not to
have been in any of the aspects, neither by way of accidental qualities nor of
substantial (ones), nor by way of quantity. (This is) because if
something were characterized by one of (these means) then that thing would have
been existent before being generated, and it is clear that nothing is generated
except what was nonexistent.
C17b And therefore it is necessary, as he says,
for all colors to have been withheld from (the original entity), and all forms
to have been withheld, and that is what he indicates [with his saying] “and similarly
it did not possess any of the components,” [that is,] there was no
intermingling of any of the natures, and therefore as he says, “there was
nothing in it of the bodies of mutually resembling parts.”
C17c [And his saying] “nor is it presumed that it
possessed any quality, nor any quantity nor any other thing at all, because
what is said about a thing of parts is that they are species of it, and that is
not a possibility” [means] that it is also impossible to think of (the
undistinguished initial substance’s) predication proving true with any existing
thing, like proving true of it that it possesses quality or quantity or
something else of the genera of existents, because if that were so there would
be a genus of existents by which its predication proved true, and if that were
so these existents would be species and the genus would be of them.
C17d And he only says that because clearly, or
from what will be made clear later, genus is not matter; that is to say, genus
is general form, while matter is of a mode where it is not necessary for a
thing in (that mode) actually to belong to that which receives (the
thing). And then the possessor is not
form at all, be it general or particular; rather, it only receives the general
form or not, and then receives the general form of the remaining forms via
mediation, down to the individual forms, and is one in number in the mode of
the substrate[6]
of the many individual forms, in forms in the mode that is distributed in
them. (Matter) in general resembles genus, except that it differs
from genus by being one in number out of a great many in the mode that its
existence is potential, while genus is one in the intermediate form between
actual and potential in a great many.
Therefore it proves true that genus is predicated of many species and of
individuals of these species, while it does not prove true of matter: it is
predicated neither of species engendered from it nor of its particulars. The ancients like Alexander wrote work on
genus not being matter, and some of that account will be reached in these
essays. (back to top)
(annotation)
#18,
Tafsīr 98.9-101.8, on 989b13-29:[7]
… (that is impossible) with all being
mixed, for it would already be separated out, while (Anaxagoras) says all is
mixed except mind, which alone is unmixed and pure. From these things, then, it falls to him to
say that the principles are the one -- for this is simple and unmixed -- and
another, of the sort we make indeterminate before it is defined and
participates in some form. So he speaks
neither correctly nor clearly, but nonetheless intends something akin to what
was said later and to what now appears more.[8] But these people turn out to be familiar only
with arguments on genesis and destruction and motion, for they are close to
only seeking the principles and causes of such essences; while the sort who
effect investigation of all being, positing the sensible of entities and the not
sensible, clearly make inquiry into both kinds.
Therefore one might spend more time on them, and we now set forth what
they say rightly or not rightly in their examination.
T18 All things are mixed, and then
(Anaxagoras?) responds (that they were?) at that time (i.e., presumably, at the
beginning),[9]
and (Anaxagoras) says that all things are mixed, excepting mind, and that it
alone is pure (and) unmixed. And then it
is contingent from these things for him to say of the principles that they are
at some point[10]
one and that it is simple and unmixed, like what we posit as indeterminate
before being defined and restricted to some species. And then one who holds the latter doctrine or
something close to it does not state a correct or clear account, especially those
whom we have now cited. However, these
doctrines are only suitable for discussion of becoming and decaying and motion
alone, and (for that) this investigation of this substance and principles and
causes suffices. (But) one who applies
thought to all existents says that some existents are sensory and some of them
non-sensory; and it is clear that this is the way that they pose their
investigation of both genera. Therefore
if an aspirant intends to explore what they say in order to discern whether what
they say is right or wrong, that can be done from the study we will now
investigate.
C18a [His saying] “and then it is contingent from
these things for him to say of the principles that they are at some point one
and that it is simple and unmixed” [means] then that from what we say for
(Anaxagoras) it is contingent to say of the principles that at some point they
are indeterminate, and at another point that they are determinate:
indeterminate and potential by virtue of their not coming to be if they are not
like that, but determinate by virtue of generation from them not being a
determination (whereas, implicitly, it must be) if they are not determined (so
that they must be).
C18b [Then he says] “and then one who holds the
latter doctrine or something close to it does not state a correct or clear
account.” [He means] about this, then,
that one who holds the latter doctrine, namely, that the element and principle
is actually an existent within the nature of things of which it is a principle,
has not spoken a correct statement, alluding by that to all of (those who held
this position), because none of them posited the material principle as
something free of the things which are generated from it; and then there is no
coming to be there, because coming to be is only from what is potential, not
from what is actual.
C18c [And his saying] “in particular those whom
we have now cited,” alludes to Empedocles, since he used to posit that the
elements were actual and that none of them changed into another.
C18d And since investigation of the elements of
moving affairs is characteristic of natural science, and consideration of them
here is only insofar as they are principles of substances existing in
themselves, and in relation to them he has only given a nature-based account
here, [he says] “however, these doctrines are only suitable for discussion of
becoming and decaying and motion alone, and (for that) this investigation of
this substance and principles and causes suffices.” [He means] that proper discussion conforming
to this basis is discussion taken from natural affairs, and the non-detailed
inquiry we have pursued into this basis here suffices here, in accordance with
what this consideration offers.
C18e[11] And by saying this he wants the need
recognized to urge the division of this consideration according to some people,
i.e., that the two sciences are not one science, given that many people used to
presume that natural and divine science were one thing in essence. [And then he says] “and one who applies
thought to all existents says that some existents are sensory and some of them
non-sensory; and it is clear that this is the way that they pose their
investigation of both genera.” [He
means] that according to (some) people among the ancients existents were divided
into two classes, sensory and non-sensory; for since they put their focus on
the two genera into making them one genus, discussion related to them is
characteristic of this science (i.e., metaphysics), and they wee those who made
mathematics the rationale of the principle of sensory affairs.
C18f [Then he says] “therefore if an aspirant
intends to explore what they say in order to discern whether what they say is
right or wrong, that can be done from the study we will now investigate.” [He means] that because this position in this
science is characteristic in relation to them, one who wishes to attend to
whether their statement is right or wrong can do that from the study we will
now explore, and from these doctrines and arguments that we (will) look into. (back to top) (annotation)
#19,
Tafsīr 101.9-104.13, on 989b29-990a6:
Now those called Pythagoreans
employ principles and elements more remote than those of the naturalists. (Parenthetically,) the reason is that they
did not receive these from sense impressions; for the mathematical of beings
are without motion except those concerning astronomy. Nonetheless
they entirely converse about, and busy themselves with nature; for they produce
the sky and watch closely the events of its parts and affects and workings, and
they expend principles and causes on these, as if agreeing with the others, the
physicists, that what is being is such as this sense impression and what is
called the sky encloses it. The causes
and principles, as we say, they say …
T19 What the Pythagoreans appeal to is that
they employ (for) principles and elements a usage departing from what the
spokesmen of natural science employ; and the reason for that is that they did
not get these causes[12]
from sensory things; for the mathematical affairs of existents are without
motion save what of them is in astronomy.
They argue continually and speak about nature, and they are pleased by
what is perceived of the sky and its parts and actions and effects and the
accompaniments of these (effects only?),[13]
and they force principles and causes on them so that they are counted as natural
scientists by us; for only what is sensory of existents arises (for these
people), and they accept the thing called sky; and on causes and principles
they make many statements of which we have spoken.
C19a Since he
recognizes that in this study the human is able to grasp the error of those who
confuse two genera of existents, I mean the sensory and the mental, in that
they make the mental a cause of the sensory, he takes up the elucidation of
that (error), [and so says] “what the Pythagoreans appeal to is that
they employ (for) principles and elements a usage departing from what the
spokesmen of natural science employ.” [He means] that the partisans of Pythagoras
make things that are unsuitable and improper for natural affairs the causes of
natural affairs.
C19b [Then he says] “and the reason for
that (departure from the naturalists) is that they did not get these things
from sensory things; for the mathematical affairs of existing affairs are
without motion save what of them is in astronomy.” [He means] that the reason for
their making unsuitable principles for natural affairs is that they did not
seek sensory principles from where these were sensory and moving, but only
sought their principles from unmoving affairs, i.e., the mathematical; for in them
there is no motion going beyond the science of form (i.e., astronomy),[14]
while the principles of moving affairs are necessarily other than the
principles of non-moving affairs.
C19c And you ought to know that
(Aristotle is) a follower of the science of form, and that its subjects are
moving and are the heavenly bodies; for it does not examine their nature in the
mode of what is in motion, but only deliberates about their figures and their
compositions in the mode of the manners of their motions, and in the mode of
their speed and their slowness, and it also deliberates about their magnitudes,
while the follower of natural science deliberates about their natures with
respect to being in motion, and distinguishes what kind of motions is permitted
from what is not permitted.
C19d [Then he says] “they argue
continually and speak about nature, and they are awed by what is perceived of
the sky and its parts and actions and effects and the accompaniments of these,
and they force principles and causes on them so that they are counted as
natural scientists by us [… to the end …] what we
have written.” [He means] that, although
they employ a principle not of nature in natural affairs, the Pythagoreans wish
to imitate natural scientists; and so they pronounce on nature and on all that
is visible of heavenly motions and their parts according to the mode in which
the followers of natural science speak of them, and on the actions and the
effects that are visible in things under the sky, while they wish to give their
reasoning on all this in the mode of mathematical affairs, that is, numbers.
C19e [And his saying] “so that they are
counted by us as natural scientists; for only what is sensory of existents
arises (for these people)” [means] that they only used
to pronounce on these things in order to be counted among the spokesmen on
nature, because they avowed that existing affairs were sensory and that
non-sensory things were there, I mean that (they said) the principles of
sensory affairs were substances separate (from them), just as many in ancient
times used to think.
C19f [And his saying] (on) the
account from them “and they accept the thing called sky; and on the causes
and the principles they make many statements” [means] that they used to make the sky of the nature of the affairs
that are under the sky, and to expound many teachings on the causes of what is
visible in it. With this he only points
to what is to be credited to their having made numerical species the cause of
existents, such as that they would make the member of a pair a cause of those
existents of which there happens to be a member of a pair, and make solitary
things a cause of those things of which there happen to be solitary things,
(or) such as that they made third a cause of all existents of which it happens
that there are three, and like that fourth and fifth. For this opinion was handed down from these
people, and was famous.
C19g And what he had said in the
places which permeate what preceded in this book is similar, and therefore [he
says] “of which we have spoken.” (back
to top) (annotation)
#20,
Tafsīr 104.14-105.13, on 990a6-10:
(They say the causes and principles)… are sufficient to go up even to
the higher of beings, and these do fit better (there) than their accounts of
nature. Nonetheless, they say nothing on
by what means there will be motion when only limited and unlimited and odd and
even are supposed …
T20 And then let us ascend to the higher of
existents, and to the property of what of them speech on nature fits; then we
say that in one way or another the motion of some of them is a bounded essence
and of others an unbounded essence, while (the Pythagoreans) say nothing on
substrate[15] and paired and single.[16]
C20a Since all the
ancients had agreed that the principles were contraries, and the partisans of
Pythagoras were those who hold existents to be numbers, they thought that
contrariness is the principle of number, i.e., limit and the absence of limit,
commencing their opposition[17]
in this mode. Then he says that for them
these two contraries exist in motion, and then it is contingent that motion is
numbers.
C20b Since the entire two
contraries have need of a substrate of them, and since of what (the
Pythagoreans) said on limit and the absence of limit they did not say what the
substrate of the two was, [he says] “while they say nothing on substrate.”
C20c And since the contraries
that exist in numbers are the paired and the single, and it is more suitable
for one who holds that numbers are composed of contraries to hold that these
contraries are paired and single, [he says] “while they say nothing on
substrate and paired and single.” (back
to top) (annotation)
#21,
Tafsīr 105.14-107.15, on 990a10-18:
(They say nothing on that) … nor on how genesis and decay, or action by
things borne through the sky, are possible without motion and change. More, if either one granted them that there
is magnitude from these things, or this were demonstrated, nonetheless in what
way will some bodies possess lightness but others weight? For on the basis of what they assume and say,
they speak no more on the mathematical of bodies than on the sensory; therefore
they say nothing whatsoever on fire or earth or the others of such bodies, I
suppose because they say nothing on sensory things in their particularity.
T21 And how is it possible for there to be
becoming and decaying without motion or change or the diverse actions from
heaven? And if it is conceded to them or
becomes clear that there is magnitude from these things, then in what way is it
thought to arise? For some bodies are
light and others are heavy, except that what they posit and say is that this is
not a primary thing for (the bodies), but that there are mathematical and
sensory bodies.[18] So therefore they did not speak of fire and
of what resembles it of bodies, nor as well do I think that for sensory things
they give a proper account.[19]
C21a [He means] that
when things are numbers no motion is there at all, and that when there is
neither motion nor change nor various heavenly motions, it is impossible for
becoming or decaying to arise there.
C21b [Then he says] “and if it is
conceded to them or becomes clear that there is magnitude from these things,
then in what way is it thought to arise?” [He
means] that within the impossibility that adheres to them, (this magnitude) is
assembled from separated quantity, I mean that units that are not in contact
and are not connected are a contiguous magnitude; however, if this
(impossibility) is conceded to them or we assume that it is perhaps possible[20]
for it to be shown, then in what way are these natural bodies diverse?
C21c [Then he says] “for some bodies are
light and others are heavy, except that what they posit and say is that this is
not a primary thing for them, but that there are mathematical and sensory
bodies.” [He
means] that given the appearance that some sensory bodies are heavy and others
are light, how is it possible for (the Pythagoreans) to produce the cause of
heaviness and lightness along with (the statement) according to them (that) the
heavy and the light body, and in general the sensory (body), and the
mathematical body are the same body in essence?
C21d That is to say, they do not
posit that mathematical bodies are prior to substance and definition for
sensory bodies, as do those who make mathematical bodies the principles of
sensory bodies. For the latter say that
bodies are of two sorts, mathematical and sensory, and that the mathematical is
prior to the sensory in existence and definition, while they (i.e., the Pythagoreans)
do not posit that some one of (these bodies) is prior to the second but do not
(even) make them multiple, let alone some of them prior to others. Instead they posit that mathematical bodies,
I mean those composed of numbers, are sensory things in essence; and then they
are unable to produce the cause by means of which some (bodies) become heavy
and others light, except (by claiming that) some of the mathematical existents
are heavy and others are light. And all
that is unseemly[21]
and absurd.
C21e And it only befalls them
that they do not state any account proper to sensory things, by virtue of their
departing from[22]
offering the reasons[23]
for things moving after not moving.
(back to top) (annotation)
#22,
Tafsīr 107.16-108.15, on 990a18-22:
Besides, how must one understand the causes of what is and becomes in
heaven to be the incidents of number or number (itself), both from the
beginning and now, on the one hand, while (understanding) there to be no number
from which the world is composed that is different from this number, on the
other?
T22 And also, how ought we to understand the
effects of numbers to be reasons and causes, and that the numbers of the sky
are existent and characteristic both in eternity[24]
and now, and that there is not some number other than this number from which
the basis of the universe arises?
C22a [He says] how is
it possible for us to understand numerical effects like paired, single, etc. as
a cause of effects in sensory things like whiteness, blackness, etc. among
effects existing in natural bodies? For
there is no relationship between effects of numbers and effects of natural
existents, and if moving existents were a number it would necessarily find[25]
the effects of numbers for them.
C22b [And his saying] “and (how
is it possible) that the numbers of the sky are existent and
characteristic, both in eternity and now, and that there is not some number
other than this number from which the basis of the universe arises?” [means] by what, then, do the numbers from which the sky (comes)
differ from the numbers from which what is under the sky comes? For the nature of an existent characteristic
of the sky is other than what there is for becoming-decaying,[26]
since the sky exists eternally, that is, for all of the three durations: past,
present and future, while becoming-decaying affairs are changeable. (But) according to (the Pythagoreans) the nature
of the number from which the basis of the universe arises is in essence the
same nature (as that of becoming-decaying affairs). (back to top) (annotation)
#23, Tafsīr 108.16-110.15, on 990a22-29:
For whenever opinion
is in a region of this (world) according to (the Pythagoreans), and due
measure, and a little above or below injustice and separating[27]
or mixing, and they say in their demonstration that each of these is a number,
but it happens that there is already a quantity of magnitudes composed at this
place because of their incidents ensuing for each of the places, then must the
number for each of these (places or magnitudes) be understood as the same as
that of heaven [or: then is the number that must be understood for each of
these (places or magnitudes) the same as that of heaven],[28]
or is it another (number) besides this?
T23 And then when (the
Pythagoreans) have thought something that is an opinion of particulars is
according to what they think, and say that what is above and below and
injustice and mixing and separating is a demonstration because each one[29]
of these is a number, then it is contingent that magnitudes are formed in this
way from many (numbers) because each one of the effects follows each one of the
places; and then it is deemed(?)[30]
(that) this number is that of the sky, and it or something close to it is
necessarily to be held of every one of these (places).
C23a [He means] that it is
contingent of this opinion that knowledge of particulars is firmly unalterable,
because number is unalterable, and then it is necessary for sensory things to
be unchanged in their substance when they are number.
C23b [And his saying] “and they
say that what is above and below and injustice and mixing and separating is a
demonstration because each one of these is a number” [means] that the greater
part of existents being paired, like top and bottom and the remaining
contraries, indicates that existents are number.
C23c And since he sets down that
this (indication) is from their statement, [he says] “then it is contingent
that magnitudes are formed in this way from many (numbers) because each one of
the effects follows each one of the places; and then it is deemed (that) this
number is that of the sky, and it or something close to it is necessarily to be
held of every one of these.” [He means]
that with this position it is contingent that all bodies are composed of
numerically many (things), and then the nature of all of them is the same
nature, and that the divisions of it and the effects occurring by its means
differ in names and in the determinations that indicate them by names, so that
some bodies are named sky and others water and others air and others fire, (and
that the names’) acquisition by these bodies is only by means of places: a
substantive division is not claimed for these places, but an affair to the
contrary.
C23d[31] And this is the
ultimate in unseemliness; for it is contingent of this position that the same
body in essence, possessing one nature in essence, when placed above is called
sky, and is delimited by definition as the sky, and is eternal by means of
place, while when below it is a becoming-decaying by means of place and is called
fire or earth or air or water. All this
is absurdly unseemly.
C23e And since these things are
unseemly they did not speak unequivocally about them, but rather they are
contingent of their statements, (and) [he says] “it or something close to it is
necessarily to be held of every one of these.”
[He means] that this that is contingent of them, or close to it, is what
must be held of each one of the bodies according to their doctrine. (back to top) (annotation)
#24,
Tafsīr 110.16-112.8, on 990a29-34 (concluding Chapter 8 and
beginning Chapter 9):
For indeed Plato says (the
already-generated number) is another (number than that of the sky); but he too
thinks both these (magnitudes) and their causes are numbers, although mental
ones for the causes and sensory ones for these.
(Chap. 9) Let us now leave off this (discussion) about the Pythagoreans, for to
touch on this much of them is sufficient.
(Preliminary
comment by Averroës:)[32] And since this mode of
unseemliness is not contingent of one who says that numbers are the principles
of sensory existents through being forms for the latter, and (since) the
determinations (by such thinkers) are not that they are sensory themselves like
(the Pythagoreans) posit, [he says]:
T24 And then Plato says that
it is another, because he thinks that these (magnitudes/bodies corresponding to
the places) and their causes are numbers, but (the numbers for) the causes
mental and (those for) these sensory.
And then let us now leave off the doctrines of the Pythagoreans: we are
content with what we have related of them.
C24a [He says] and then Plato
says that the number that is the cause(s?)[33]
of the sensory is other than the number that is the sensory, because he thinks
that the number that is the cause(s?) of sensory numbers is from sensory
things, and that their formal causes are numbers. However, he says that the numbers that are
causes are by nature mental, while the numbers of which they are causes are by
nature sensory things.
C24b And since (Aristotle)
thinks that what he has said in response to the Pythagoreans is sufficient, and
that after this he ought to begin the response to saying that numbers are
causes of sensory things (i.e., rather than identical with them), [he says]
“and then let us now leave off the doctrines of the Pythagoreans: we are
content with what we have related of them.”
And then the statement sets forth an expression of bidding himself to leave
off what was his act in relating their opinions, and of contentment with
(stating) their deviation on (the subject), due to our (i.e., Aristotle’s
audience) obtaining assurance of the issue concerning (the subject) and
(concerning) its necessity from that (discussion). For a person only bids him/herself to do what
is within the design necessary for him/her, and then since the statement has
set forth this expression, (Aristotle) has understood it to be within the
necessary design. It is within the modes
of collective ability[34]
that all peoples are given to understand that, and therefore he begins in the
book Prior Analytics, and speaks to conveying whence investigation is,
and to what the thing for whose sake there is investigation is.
(back to top) (annotation)
(comments
50-51)