Averroës
on Aristotle’s Criticism of his Predecessors:
An annotated translation of the long commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics A
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Comments 50-51
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#50, on 993a11-17 (beginning Chapter 10):
So then[1]
(the points) that everyone seems to seek the causes spoken of in (my)
physical works, and that beyond these there are none we could cite, are indeed
clear from what has been said above. But
these (causes have been seen) murkily, and while in one way they were all cited
earlier, in another way not at all. For
the earliest philosophy seems to babble[2]
about all things, being young and ... like(?)[3]
a beginning [and the first].[4]
T50 And then (the points) that
what is said on the natural causes[5]
resembles (the outcome) that all adherents of the comparable have sought, and
that we did not produce a single cause outside of them, are apparent from the
preceding, and it is appropriate for first[6]
philosophy to examine doctrine on all things; for it comprehends all causes and
what is first.
C50a [He says] then that what we
have said on the kinds of natural causes having been said by others than us,
among the ancients, is clear from what we have related of them; and similarly
it is apparent according to our reporting on the sorts of causes that we did
not report a cause additional to the kinds of causes the ancients reported,
indicating that the ancients with respect to his time had stopped at the four
causes. And this is what he relates of the ancients in this essay
(i.e., this book of the Metaphysics),[7]
his perception that they recognized the cause by way of matter and that by way
of form and that by way of agent. As to
the cause by way of purpose, no account of it is apparent from the statement he
makes, (i.e.,) from what he reports of the ancients on the causes in this
essay; however, it bears a resemblance that there are some who hold the agent,
and then the statement on the purpose cause has been contingent, because action
only acts for the sake of something.
(But) any who deny agency, alleging (that things happen by) chance, do
not posit the purpose cause and do not recognize it.
C50b And similarly, with that he
alludes to Socrates and Plato; for he (i.e., I presume, Plato)[8]
reports in another place that people in the time of Socrates were aware of the
purpose cause, and that for the sake of that, meaning in accordance with what
they believed about the purpose of humanity, they were disposed to the
management of cities.
C50c [And his saying] “and it is
appropriate for first philosophy to examine doctrine on all things; for it
comprehends all causes and what is first” [means] that it is appropriate that
for it to appear from all of this that philosophy is that which examines
doctrine on principles and contemplates their entirety, and especially the
foremost of (these principles) on existence and the foremost on knowledge.
(back
to top) ( annotation)
#51, on 993a17-27 (concluding
Chapter 10 and Book A):
(The foregoing is
the case,) since Empedocles as well says that the being of bone is by ratio;
and this is to be the “what it was” and the substance of the affair. But surely it is likewise necessary for flesh
and other things each to be (on account of?)[9]
ratio, or else not one (thing would be so); and then each of flesh and bone and
the rest will be on account of this, not on account of the matter he speaks of:
fire, earth, water, and air. But while
by necessity he would agree with these things if someone else said them, he did
not say so plainly. Now what concerns
these things has indeed been made clear above, but one might be at an impasse
over such as them, so let us go over them again; for perhaps we might glean
something from them for later difficulties.
T51 And (philosophy has that
scope) because Empedocles says that definition is (what) bone (is);[10]
and this is the thing of it that is the substance of the affair; yet according
to this example (definition) is necessarily also flesh, and every other affair,
or it is not any one of them; and therefore (definition) is (what is) flesh and
bone and every one of the remaining affairs, and that is not on account of the
matter he says of that (subject) that they are: fire, earth, water, and
air. He does not posit the cause of what
he says on these things, but it is forced to hold (something) else; still, he
did not say what he said with an explanation and an illustration. The business of these (issues) and their like
was explained in the foregoing, and we will return to speaking of all the
uncertainties that occur with them, but for now we ought to promptly begin
saying something on the uncertainties occurring with other affairs.
C51a Since the bulk of those of
the ancients who spoke on natural affairs, along with giving a natural doctrine
on matter, spoke on matter while not speaking on the form pertinent to moving
affairs, except Empedocles, and then (since Aristotle) recognizes that
Empedocles alluded to (form) while not articulating a clear explanation on
that, but rather the statement on the cause by way of form was contingent of
his account, (Aristotle) first takes up relating from where in his account that
(issue) is contingent, [and so says] “and (philosophy has that scope) because
Empedocles says that definition is bone; and this is the thing of it that is
the substance of the affair, yet according to this example (definition) is
necessarily also flesh, and every other affair, or it is not any one of
them.” [He means] that, however, since
Empedocles had said about bone that its being bone was the definition by which
it was divided from the rest of composite affairs, and (since) definition was
what indicated its form and its substance, then clearly it is contingent that
the name “flesh” and others of things composed of the elements indicate a
meaning added to matter, or else there is nothing for which these names
indicate definition(s?) of the thing (or of things?).[11]
C51b [Then he says] “and therefore
(definition) is (what is) flesh and bone and every one of the other affairs,
and that is not on account of the matter he says of that that they are: fire,
earth, water, and air.” [He means] that
therefore the statement that Empedocles gives on bone is contingent of flesh
and of every composed thing (and)[12]
that what the names indicate is not by means of the matter that he states of
them alone. Rather, it is necessary for
him to posit a cause additional to matter, i.e., form; I mean that it is necessary
for him to support the (additional) cause equally with the material cause, and
that he deal with this cause for every generated thing.
C51c And since (Empedocles) was
not wont to do this, [(Aristotle) says] “he did not say what he said with an
explanation and an illustration.” [He
means] (this) on the part of him not explicating the seat(?)[13]
of this cause, nor the specification of what in a thing is something of
entities composed of the four elements.
C51d [And his saying] “the
business of these things was explained in the foregoing” [means] in (works on)
natural science, because the affair of forms was explained there.
C51e And since whatever there
are of uncertainties in that (affair) are resolved in this science (i.e.,
metaphysics), [he says] “and we will return to statements about all the
uncertainties that occur with (the subject).”
C51f Then he communicates the
goal he is resolved to keep in mind in the essay following this one[14]
[and so says] “and we ought to promptly begin saying something on the
uncertainties occurring with other affairs,” [meaning] on the uncertainties
occurring for the claimant of this difficult science.
(Thus) is completed the
second essay,[15]
denoted by the letter “large alpha.”
(back
to top) (annotation)
(go to concluding
remarks)