Averroës on Aristotle’s Criticism of his Predecessors:
An annotated translation of the long commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics A
Comments 50-51
#50, on 993a11-17 (beginning
Chapter 10):
So
then[1]
(the points) that everyone seems to seek the causes spoken of in (my)
physical works, and that beyond these there are none we could cite, are indeed
clear from what has been said above. But these (causes have been seen) murkily,
and while in one way they were all cited earlier, in another way not at all.
For the earliest philosophy seems to babble[2]
about all things, being young and ... like(?)[3]
a beginning [and the first].[4]
T50 And
then (the points) that what is said on the natural causes[5]
resembles (the outcome) that all adherents of the comparable have sought, and
that we did not produce a single cause outside of them, are apparent from the
preceding, and it is appropriate for first[6]
philosophy to examine doctrine on all things; for it comprehends all causes and
what is first.
C50a [He
says] then that what we have said on the kinds of natural causes having been
said by others than us, among the ancients, is clear from what we have related
of them; and similarly it is apparent according to our reporting on the sorts
of causes that we did not report a cause additional to the kinds of causes the
ancients reported, indicating that the ancients with respect to his time had
stopped at the four causes. And this is what he relates of the
ancients in this essay (i.e., this book of the Metaphysics),[7]
his perception that they recognized the cause by way of matter and that by way
of form and that by way of agent. As to the cause by way of purpose, no account
of it is apparent from the statement he makes, (i.e.,) from what he reports of
the ancients on the causes in this essay; however, it bears a resemblance that
there are some who hold the agent, and then the statement on the purpose cause
has been contingent, because action only acts for the sake of something. (But)
any who deny agency, alleging (that things happen by) chance, do not posit the purpose
cause and do not recognize it.
C50b And
similarly, with that he alludes to Socrates and Plato; for he (i.e., I presume,
Plato)[8]
reports in another place that people in the time of Socrates were aware of the
purpose cause, and that for the sake of that, meaning in accordance with what
they believed about the purpose of humanity, they were disposed to the
management of cities.
C50c [And
his saying] “and it is appropriate for first philosophy to examine doctrine on
all things; for it comprehends all causes and what is first” [means] that it is
appropriate that for it to appear from all of this that philosophy is that
which examines doctrine on principles and contemplates their entirety, and
especially the foremost of (these principles) on existence and the foremost on
knowledge.
(back to top) ( annotation)
#51, on
993a17-27 (concluding Chapter 10 and Book A):
(The
foregoing is the case,) since Empedocles as well says that the being of bone is
by ratio; and this is to be the “what it was” and the substance of the affair.
But surely it is likewise necessary for flesh and other things each to be (on
account of?)[9]
ratio, or else not one (thing would be so); and then each of flesh and bone and
the rest will be on account of this, not on account of the matter he speaks of:
fire, earth, water, and air. But while by necessity he would agree with these
things if someone else said them, he did not say so plainly. Now what concerns
these things has indeed been made clear above, but one might be at an impasse
over such as them, so let us go over them again; for perhaps we might glean
something from them for later difficulties.
T51 And
(philosophy has that scope) because Empedocles says that definition is (what)
bone (is);[10]
and this is the thing of it that is the substance of the affair; yet according
to this example (definition) is necessarily also flesh, and every other affair,
or it is not any one of them; and therefore (definition) is (what is) flesh and
bone and every one of the remaining affairs, and that is not on account of the
matter he says of that (subject) that they are: fire, earth, water, and air. He
does not posit the cause of what he says on these things, but it is forced to
hold (something) else; still, he did not say what he said with an explanation
and an illustration. The business of these (issues) and their like was
explained in the foregoing, and we will return to speaking of all the
uncertainties that occur with them, but for now we ought to promptly begin
saying something on the uncertainties occurring with other affairs.
C51a Since
the bulk of those of the ancients who spoke on natural affairs, along with giving
a natural doctrine on matter, spoke on matter while not speaking on the form
pertinent to moving affairs, except Empedocles, and then (since Aristotle)
recognizes that Empedocles alluded to (form) while not articulating a clear
explanation on that, but rather the statement on the cause by way of form was
contingent of his account, (Aristotle) first takes up relating from where in
his account that (issue) is contingent, [and so says] “and (philosophy has that
scope) because Empedocles says that definition is bone; and this is the thing
of it that is the substance of the affair, yet according to this example
(definition) is necessarily also flesh, and every other affair, or it is not
any one of them.” [He means] that, however, since Empedocles had said about
bone that its being bone was the definition by which it was divided from the
rest of composite affairs, and (since) definition was what indicated its form
and its substance, then clearly it is contingent that the name “flesh” and
others of things composed of the elements indicate a meaning added to matter,
or else there is nothing for which these names indicate definition(s?) of the
thing (or of things?).[11]
C51b [Then
he says] “and therefore (definition) is (what is) flesh and bone and every one
of the other affairs, and that is not on account of the matter he says of that
that they are: fire, earth, water, and air.” [He means] that therefore the
statement that Empedocles gives on bone is contingent of flesh and of every
composed thing (and)[12]
that what the names indicate is not by means of the matter that he states of
them alone. Rather, it is necessary for him to posit a cause additional to
matter, i.e., form; I mean that it is necessary for him to support the
(additional) cause equally with the material cause, and that he deal with this
cause for every generated thing.
C51c And
since (Empedocles) was not wont to do this, [(Aristotle) says] “he did not say
what he said with an explanation and an illustration.” [He means] (this) on the
part of him not explicating the seat(?)[13]
of this cause, nor the specification of what in a thing is something of
entities composed of the four elements.
C51d [And
his saying] “the business of these things was explained in the foregoing”
[means] in (works on) natural science, because the affair of forms was
explained there.
C51e And
since whatever there are of uncertainties in that (affair) are resolved in this
science (i.e., metaphysics), [he says] “and we will return to statements about
all the uncertainties that occur with (the subject).”
C51f Then
he communicates the goal he is resolved to keep in mind in the essay following
this one[14]
[and so says] “and we ought to promptly begin saying something on the
uncertainties occurring with other affairs,” [meaning] on the uncertainties
occurring for the claimant of this difficult science.
(Thus)
is completed the second essay,[15]
denoted by the letter “large alpha.”
(back to top) (annotation)
(go to concluding
remarks)
[1]
The resumptive particle ïὖí
may be construed as encompassing all of the discussion of the pre-Aristotelian use
of causes, announced in Chapter 3 (983a24-b6) before being detailed
subsequently. A. also notes in that paragraph that the causes are those treated
in the physical works, and predicts that the discussion to come will either
discover a new cause or bear out that the four are sufficient. Cf. Reale III 99 n. 2.
[2]
psellomenēi, i.e., speak like a child (so LSJ); R. and
others think of “lisp,” but that reduction to a physical aspect destroys the
force of A.’s comparison.
[3]
There is material missing from the MSS, noted by the ellipsis in my
translation, and it could well alter the meaning of kata here. It also seems possible
that the marked deviation in N.’s translation of the
end of the segment is related to this lacuna.
[4]
Recent editors reject MS êáὶ ôὸ
ðñῶôïí as merely constituting an
alternate reading of the preceding phrase êáô᾿ ἀñ÷άò.
N. does not seem to read it, granted that there is uncertainty in the Greek
text he saw (cf. previous note).
[5]
In misconstruing en tois phusikois
aitias, “causes (spoken of) in the physics,” as fī l-‘ilal aṭ-ṭabi‘iyya (الطبيعيلة),
“on the physical causes,” here, presumably N. does not notice that aitias is in the accusative case but tois phusikois in
the dative, so that the one cannot be an adjective of the other.
[6]
awwalī. It
is possible that it means A.’s “earliest” (prōtē)
here, but for that N. would more likely say aqdam,
and in any case what Av. himself reads into it is something more fundamental,
not what is earlier in time.
[7]
maqāla; cf. n. 10
to comments 1-8.
[8]
I assume A. is not meant because, while the subject is certain treated in his Politics
(for discussion, see now Monte R.
Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology [
[9]
The preposition is explicit if we follow an emendation endorsed by J. But it
may be that the meaning is indeed “flesh (or other entity) is ratio;”
see Dooley 179 n. 386.
[10]
al-ḥaddu huwa ‘aẓmun ( الحد هو
عظم). If we
presume that “definition” corresponds to A.’s logos,
“ratio” or “formula” (so Alex. interprets it; see Dooley 178 n. 384) it would
have been more in accord with the latter’s meaning to say something like “bone
is by definition” (al-‘aẓmu
huwa bi-l-ḥaddi),
[11]
There is manuscript variation on singular vs. plural for both terms.
[12]
The copula wa is explicit in some MSS.
[13]
‘umūr, an obscure term, formally a plural. Lane’s
Lexicon says that the ‘amr of which this form
is the plural is “the space between the teeth,” and suggests that the plural is
the place where teeth grow.
[14]
That is, Book B of the Metaphysics, which by Av.’s account is next since
he takes Book a to be prior to A.
[15]
See above note.
