Averroës on Aristotle’s Criticism of his Predecessors:

An annotated translation of the long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics A

 

Comments 9-16

 

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#9, Tafsīr 75.4-78.11, on 988a4-16:

            (... while the form generates only one; but clearly, from one material there is one table,)[1] while the bringer of the form, although one, makes many (tables). And the male in relation to the female is similar; for she is impregnated by one covering, while the male impregnates many, and surely these are the images of those principles (relating the forms to matter). Plato, then, decided thusly on the objects of investigation, but it is clear from what has been said that he uses only two causes: that from which is the “what is,” and that concerning matter -- for the forms are causes of the “what is” of other things; the one, (the cause of the “what is”) of the forms.  And (it is clear) what matter, the substratum, is, in the sense that it is said that the forms are of sensory things, on the one hand, and that the one is in the forms, on the other[2]: this (matter/substratum) is dual, the great and the small. Moreover, he has given the cause of good and of evil to the two ele-ments, the one to one (i.e., the one) and the other to the other (i.e., the great and the small),[3] just as we say some earlier philosophers also attempted, like Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

T9       And the species differs[4] in that it is one but does much, and similarly is the male in (doing) much; so these are examples and similes of the principles which those (people?)[5] used to hold. And then Plato defined them in this way in his book on the (subject that is) sought, and it is apparent from what has been said that he only used two causes: the quiddity[6] of the thing and what is in the mode of matter; for species are the cause of the quiddity of the remaining affairs, and then species are the one.  And the thing that is substrate matter is that in whose company species are found, and in which are what is said to be in species; for the quiddity of the two-fold is the great and the small, and also, for he presented the cause of the good and the praiseworthy as the elements,[7] each one of them to those remaining, and they are the things of which we have said exami-na-tion occurred in the beginnings. [Ịn the Greek (there is) a blank.]

9a.      [(As to) his saying] “and the species differs in that it is one but does much, and similarly is the male in (doing) much; so these are examples and similes of the principles which those (people) used to hold,” that (statement) occurs cut off from what preceded it (in the original Greek text), but is one of the kinds of argument that (those people) used to profess in saying that forms are the making of individuals because their nature resembles the nature of the male who does much, I mean that he engenders many.

9b.      And since this kind of argument is one of what he states of their arguments that are omitted in (the translated) copy, [he says (as already cited)] “and then these are examples and similes of the principles.” [He means] that these are the arguments and similes, reliance on which says that these things are principles, I mean that given this kind of similarity that they presumed between species and true principles, they presumed that species were principles.

9c.       [(As to) his saying] “and then Plato defined them in this way in his book on the (subject) sought,” [that is] that he defined species to be principles in the mode of form and the mode of agent.

9d.      [Then he says] “and it is apparent that he only used two causes alone: the quiddity of the thing and what is in the mode of matter,” [that is,] that he made the quiddities of things and their definitions the forms of things, and made matter the things of which they were forms.

9e.      [Then he says] “for species are the cause of the quiddity of the remaining affairs.” [He means] (the preceding is so,) for species, that is, forms, according to (Plato), are the quiddity of the remaining things, I mean those which are not (themselves) forms.

9f.       [And his saying] “and then (singular) species is [8] the one; and the thing that is substrate matter is that in whose company are found species” [means] that the (plural) species that are truthfully called by that name are the totality of the general form and matter, like the case where the human species is not its form alone as Plato took it to be, but the totality of matter and form.

9g.      [And his saying] “and in which is[9] what is said to be in (plural) species; for the quiddity of the two-fold (entity) is the great and the small” [means] that the indication that the forms are not species is that it is said that the quiddity of the thing that is the form is in the (singular) species, in the mode that it is part of (the species), like two-fold(ness) is, for according to the holders of (the form’s) quiddity as a princi-ple, (the quiddity) is the great and the small, but the great and the small are other than the two-fold (entity).

9h.      [And his saying] “and for he also presented the cause of the good and the praiseworthy as the elements,” [means] of the indication that (Plato) professes matter and form, that he presented the cause of the good and the praiseworthy and their opposite,[10] and that (presentation?)[11] is nothing but matter and form.

9i.        [And his saying] “each one of them to those remaining” [means] that (Plato) presented the cause of the remaining things of the praiseworthy and the good appearing in existents by means of each one of the two elements[12] posited, matter and form.

9k.       He then explains what those remaining things are, [and so says] “and they are the things of which we have said exami-na-tion occurred in the beginnings.” [He means] that these are later things appearing in existents, and are those for which one wants their causes to be given by means of principles, and (for which) the principles are authenticated by means of that (process). He only says that because, according to the study of principles, their consistency is sought for all that appears in existents.  That is to say, when perceived affairs are inconsistent with existents, then what is posited of their being principles of existents is inauthentic, while when perceived affairs are consistent, then it is possible for them to be authentic.  It is not necessarily indicated by that means that they are principles until perceived affairs indicate them, I mean that when later affairs indicate the existence of earlier it is certain that the earlier are principles.  This was shown in working out the demonstration.[13]

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{That concludes Chapter 6. Next, whether by choice or as the result of what his translator has made available (i.e., if the lacuna he reports extends throughout the omitted material), Averroës skips most of Chapter 7, where Aristotle summarizes what his predecessors have or have not seen, to take up material near its end.}

 

#10, Tafsīr 78.12-79.7, on 988b17-19:

            (That, then, we have correctly distinguished the causes and how many and of what type,)[14] all these (people) seem to bear witness for us, in their not being able to touch on[15] another cause; in addition, it is clear that principles are to be sought either entirely thusly or in some such[16] way.

T10      And (it is) fitting[17] that all of these (?)[18] are testifying for us, because it is impossible for them to add another cause, and along with that, for it is clear that investigation comes to pass from principles, whether according to all of these ways or according to some of them.      

C10a   [He says] it is fitting that what they (= who?) said on the number of genera of causes, and what their investigation ultimately got to, was the impossibility of adding a fifth cause to the causes they cited, I mean the causes in the mode of matter, and (those) of form and of purpose and of agent.

C10b   [And his saying] “and along with that (it is fitting,) for it is clear that investigation comes to pass from principles, be it according to all of these ways or be it according to some of them” [means] that along with this (it is fitting,) for since it was shown that the ancients were unable to add to the number of principles we have cited, it is clear that for each one of (all) existents the inquiry comes to pass either according to all of those principles we have cited or according to some of them. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#11, Tafsīr 79.8-81.14, on 988b20-29:

            After this we should go over the possible problems of how each of these (earlier thinkers) has spoken and of what he holds about the principles (or:  we should go over how each  has spoken and the possible problems of what he holds  ).[19] (End of Chapter 7, 988b20-21.)

            (Beginning Chapter 8 within the same Arabic text, 988b22-29:) Now clearly the likes of those who make everything one, and some one nature as its material, with this having body and extent, err in many ways. For they make elements only of bodies, not of the bodiless, [and of bodiless beings (there are some)].[20] Also, their undertakings to speak about the causes of generation and destruction, and about all discussion of nature, abolish the cause of motion. Besides, in this they do not make substance the cause of anything, nor the “what is” (of anything).

T11      And then after this we shall consider how each one of them(?)[21] spoke on (the principles) and how it is possible for him to be doubted by the doubts with which it is possible to be skeptical on the principles. And it is clear that all of those who posited some one nature for everything, it being material, and made it bodily, of the essence of magnitude, have erred in a variety of ways, because they only posited elements of bodies alone, and not non-bodily affairs. And they wanted to speak on the causes of becoming and decaying, and to speak as well on the rest of things in any nature discussion; yet they abolished the cause of motion. For they also posited no cause at all of[22] substance, nor spoke of its quiddity.

C11a   [He says] we are finished with citing the opinions of these (thinkers) on the principles, and after that statement we want to speak of the manner of the statement of each one of them on the principle he posited, I mean in what way his positing was a principle; of the scope of the argument that moved him to that; and out of the doubts that concern the principles, of those with which it is possible to be skeptical of (these thinkers).

C11b   He then commences the account of attendant doubts about (the opinions), and begins that (account) with the people he cited first, [and so he says] “and it is clear that all of those who posited some one nature for everything, it being material, and made it bodily, of the essence of magnitude, have erred in a variety of ways.” [He means] it is clear that the ancients who posited a single nature for everything, it being material, and made it bodily, whether fire or air or water, have erred in a variety of ways.

C11c   He then comes to their first error, [and says] “because they posited elements of bodies alone, and not non-bodily affairs.” [He means] that the first of their errors was that they posited the primary element as one of the bodies, and did not posit any substance not of a body. That is to say, (as to) body, what is perceived of its affair is that it is composite, and therefore becoming and decaying befalls it, meaning that it is necessary that the primary element neither becomes nor decays, because (i.e., therefore) it has been contingent that there is an element of the element. And that (argument) passes to infinity.

C11d   He then cites the deficiency that entered with their positing the first principle as one of the bodies, [and so says] “and they wanted to speak on the causes of becoming and decaying, and to speak on the rest of things in any nature discussion.” [He means] that by means of this position they wanted to speak on the causes of becoming and decaying, and then according to that (position) could not, because true becoming and decay is only found for bodies; but despite this they were able to speak on what transcends becoming, like something not of nature, by their diverging from making mathematical affairs the principles of natural affairs -- as if he praises them in this aspect.

C11e   He then takes up relating what their deficiency was in the principles of natural affairs as well, [and so says] “yet they abolished the cause of motion.” [He means] that yet, along with their revealing a material reason and their acknowledging that things move, they neglected to mention the cause of the motion of matter, whereas it is impossible for matter to move by itself.

C11f    [Then he says] “and they also posited no cause of substance at all, nor spoke of its quiddity.” [He means] that along with their neglect of the agent reason, they also neglected the cause of the substances (which might be) attributed to (this cause), those which actually become substances and stand in themselves, and it is the cause that is quiddity and form.

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#12, Tafsīr 81.15-84.14, on 988b29-34:

            And besides this they say simplistically that any one of the simple bodies what-soever, save earth, is a principle, not reflecting on how these, I mean fire and water and earth and air, are made by arising from one another. For they arise by coming together or separating from one another, and this makes the most difference for what is anterior and what posterior.

T12      And along with that they then say facilely that the simple bodies are the principle, because in their study of becoming they do not authorize some of them arising from others, save earth, I mean fire and water and air, except that some of them only come to be from others in the mode of assembly and some in the mode of separation, and this becomes their state at first, while at the end they differ by a great difference.

C12a   [He says] that all the ancients speak as if it is a simple affair for the (principal) element[23] to be one of these three, I mean fire or air or water, save earth, along with their authorizing(?)[24] what is most conducive of all of them to being the (principal) element in one way; and then no statement of any of them, I mean a statement of one who says that it is fire or air or water, is more primary than the statement of his colleague.[25] The reason for that, that is, that the indication of (principal) element by one of them is not more primary than the indication of the other, is that they, that is to say, each one who was more inclined to one of (the elements) except earth being the (principal) element, followed a common procedure in that (process). And then he only inferred that (indicated principal element) from the remaining (elements) being formed from it, either in the mode of assembly or in the mode of separation; that is, the condensation or rarefaction happening to them is on the part of the portions of which they are composed. That is to say, the one who says the (principal) element is fire only believes it to be the (principal) element because the remaining (elements) have been formed from it in the mode of assembly, that is, condensation, and that is to say, this alleges that when fire thickens, air arises from that, and when air thickens, water arises out of it. The one who believes that it is air makes it a (principal) element entirely in two ways, I mean rarefaction and condensation; that is, when it is rarified it becomes fire and when it thickens it becomes water. And the one who holds that the (principal) element is water also holds that when it thickens it becomes earth and when it is rarified it becomes air. And since none of them said that what characterized the (principal) element was rarefaction, none said that earth was the (principal) element of the remaining (elements), while that had been possible in the mode of this logic. (Aristotle) only means that if becoming is posited in this way it is made necessary that every one of (the elements) be a (principal) element for those remaining.

C12b   [And (as to) his saying] “while at the end they differ by a great difference,” the appearance of his statement is that he regards (the thinkers) in their making the direction of the dif-fer-ence between the element and what is generated from it by means of conden-sation and rarefaction.  (He does so) because if it is granted that (their doing this) is the reason for the diversity in element and (in) what of the four bodies is generated from the primary element, then this is by holding that that (means of condensation and rarefaction) is a mode and a possibility. Indeed, when the eventual difference between existents and these simple bodies and compounds of them is demanded, it is not tolerable that anyone reach the cause by means of (thinking of) condensation and rarefaction. That is to say, the basis of things that are generated from the four elements differs from the basis of the elements by a great difference, and also the compounds of any of them differ from others by a great difference. It cannot be said of (the difference) that it is by means of condensation and rarefaction, because all of these (elements and compounds) differ from one another in quiddity and definition, like the contrast of flesh and bone to the four elements, and like the contrast of bone to flesh.

C12c   It is unlikely that this statement is an account from them, and a general excuse attaches to them from this misgiving (i.e., the problem just noted). I mean that [his (just cit-ed) saying] “while at the end they differ by a great difference” is as if they said that the difference (between the materials) in themselves is insignificant, due to their difference only being in condensation and rarefaction, not the compounding of the simple (body). Then when existents are finally generated from (the four elements) there is a more diverse diversity in the multiplicity of the mixture of kinds of condensation and rarefaction of the existent in the simple (bodies). Nonetheless, the relation of each of these existents to the nature of whatever of these four was held to be the (principal) element indicates that (their proponents) did not excuse their statement in the manner of this apology; I mean that one who was saying that the element was fire said that the quiddity of all existents was fire, and that they become fire afterwards, and similarly the statement of one who said the element was air or water. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#13, Tafsīr 84.15-86.6, on 988b34-989a5:

            For on the one hand one might think the most elementary of all to be that from which (the four elements) come to be at first by combining, and such would be the most finely divided and smallest of bodies.  Therefore (to begin a parenthetical comment) those who make fire the principle would speak especi-ally in conformance with this argu-ment; though each of the others also agrees that the element of bodies is such.[26]

T13      And then of all these opinions, the opinion that is the most fitting for regularity is holding that (the four elements) are from the first mixing, and then this (mixing) is of the smallest of bodies; and there-fore all who say that the principle is fire come to settle on that (position) and hold it, and (= but) in this way each one of them recognizes the definition of (principal) element as this, I mean that it is that thing of bodies whose degree is ultimate.

C13a   [He says] that the preferable opinion of what is said on the elements, and that bestows consistency on what appears in defining the (principal) element and in presenting the reasons for what appears in changeable affairs, is holding that these elements are composed from the first mixing, which is of undivided bodies.

C13b   [His saying] “there-fore all who say that the principle is fire come to settle on that (position) and hold it” [means] that therefore one who says the principle is fire then comes to recognizing contingently that the (principal) element is undivided bodies, because since fire becomes a principle for them only by means of being finer, and is finer for them by means of smallness of parts, it is perhaps necessary for small parts to be the principle.

C13c   [And his saying] “and in this way each one of them recognizes the definition of (principal) element as this, I mean that whose degree is ultimate” [means] that with regard to holding that the parts are undivided, everyone of those who hold that (opinion) avows that the definition of (principal) element is that it is that whose degree is last in existence (and) first in time and becoming, not one who says that <the definition of?>[27] the (principal) element is <that it is> one of the simple bodies, because none of these bodies is of last degree in existence, meaning that this statement alone suits the definition of (principal) element, and holding it is contingent of one whose avowal is by the definition of (principal) element. And one who does not hold that the parts (of the principal element) are undivided cannot hold the definition of (principal) element. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#14, Tafsīr 86.7-89.3, on 989a5-18:

            At any rate, none of those speaking of one element deems earth worthy, clearly because of its coarse parts.  Some arbiter grasps each of the (other) three elements, for some say this is fire, others water, and others air, but why do they never say earth as well, like most people?  For they say all is earth, and also Hesiod says earth arises first of the bodies; thus antiquity and populace agree on it as the understanding (to conclude the parenthetical comment).[28] According to this argument, then, neither any of these (monists) who said something other than fire, nor any who posited this (principle) to be denser than air but finer than water,[29] would be right. On the other hand,[30] if what comes to be later is by nature primary,[31] i.e., the concocted[32] and the assembled is later in generation, this would be the opposite, water before air and earth before water.

T14      It is clear from their concern that those who say that the (principal) element is one and that it is earth only hold that by reason of the largeness of (its) parts, while each one of the (other) three elements is singled out by someone among (these thinkers), some saying that it is fire and others water and others air.  They do not say that earth is a thing of (the possible principal elements), like a great many people used to say, that all things are earth; and Hesiod[33] says that earth is the first principle of bodies and it used to be believed that that (opinion) was a well known affair. In accordance with this account, none of those who held to fire alone of these (elements), nor any of those who posited that air is denser than fire and finer than water, spoke a correct statement. And then if that whose becoming is primary is later in exist-ence by nature,[34] and the becoming of the cooked and the distinguished is later, then the holder of water being prior to air and earth prior to water spoke according to the converse.

C14a   [He says] “it is clear that those who say that the (principal) element is earth only hold that by reason of the largeness of (its) parts,”[35] because when fineness is by reason of the smallness of parts, coarseness is necessarily in accordance with largeness; and these (people) spoke like what he says, that they spoke the opposite about the (principal) element of what its situation demands, because that whose degree is ultimate by nature is smaller.

C14b   [And his saying] “while each one of the (other) three elements is singled out by someone among (these thinkers)” [up to his saying] “that was a well known affair” [means] that by the stance of fleeing from positing the (principal) element as something not demanding the definition of (principal) element, none of the physicists held that earth was the element; they only held the three alone, and then some said that it was fire, the nearest to the definition of (principal) element, and some said air or water, the two furthest from the definition of (principal) element, that is to say, they were nearest in one way but furthest in another: near for one who supported air, because with him air is smaller of parts than water, but far because with him it is greater of parts than fire. And like that was the situation of one who said that it was water, that is to say, it is finer than earth and coarser than air. The man[36] he cites was a famous man compared with them[37] in positing rules[38] and rule-based mysteries.[39]

C14c   [His saying] “in accordance with this account, none of those who held fire alone of these (elements), nor any of those who posited that air is denser than fire and finer than water, spoke a correct statement” [means] according to the account of any who said that earth was the (principal) element by its being greatest of parts, the account of none who said that the (principal) element was fire or air or water was a correct account: neither the one who said it was fire because his statement contradicted that statement, nor the one who made it one of the remaining two elements because (this makes) large of the small and small of the large and is an extremely inconsistent statement.

C14d   [Then he says] “and then if that whose becoming is primary is later by nature, and the becoming of the cooked and the distinguished is later, then the holder of water being prior to air and earth prior to water spoke according to the converse.” [He means] that if what comes to be earlier in time is later by nature, it is the (principal) element, while what comes to be later in time is generated as distinguished from the element, or cooked from it, or however you want to say it; and then one who says air is the element of fire, and water the element of air, and in general one who makes the coarser the element of the finer, has then spoken the converse of the definition of (principal) element, because when water is prior to air in becoming while water is of parts greater than the parts of air, then the greater has been made prior to the smaller in becoming, and an element of it, while it is clear that the smaller is prior to the greater in becoming since the greater dissolves into the smaller. And then as he says, these (people) held something opposite to one who says that the smaller is the element of the larger and is what suits the definition of (principal) element. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#15, Tafsīr 89.4-93.10, on 989a18-30:

            Let that be said, then, about the sort whom we have said posited one cause. And it is the same if one posits more, like Empe-do-cles saying that four bodies are the material. For also in this (view) some things are the same, while necessarily distinctive things occur; for we see things generated from one another, as the same body does not always persist as fire or earth -- this is said about them in (our writings) on nature -- and it is to be thought that he did not speak entirely rightly or rationally(?)[40] as to whether one or two causes of motions are to be posited. And for those who speak thusly it is necessary to entirely abolish alteration; for cold is not from heat, nor heat from cold, for then something would suffer being both opposites, or something of a single nature would become fire and water, which he does not say.

T15      And then let the statements that have been cited be what is said of those who posited one cause, however it is said that they speak; and we(?) shall follow[41] this road in essence in relation to those who posit more than one, like Empedocles, for he says that the material bodies are four; for this (?)[42] is that there are things adhering to him, some of which are these (arguments against the monists) in essence, while things occur that are necessarily characteristic; and we have spoken of things of which we witness some changing into others since they did not always stay in one state like fire and earth and body itself; and we have also spoken of them and of the cause of motions as to positing one or two causes in the account on natural affairs; and (Empedocles) was not right, nor did he entirely and completely state an upright statement of the abolition of transformation. That is to say, it is necessarily contingent of one who holds this doctrine that cold is not from hot; nor hot from cold, because the same thing does not admit opposites; and so it is therefore necessary that the generated nature be one in itself, fire or water, (and)[43] this is not what he says.

C15a   [He says] then let these objections be employed with respect to those who say that the material cause is one body of these three or four bodies, whatever body it is.

C15b   [Then he says] “and we shall follow this road in essence in relation to those who posit more than one, like Empedocles, for he says that the material bodies are four.” [He means] that, just as it was contingent of the upholders of one (principal) element that that element be a composite of parts, so it is contingent of Empedocles, because every one of them thinks that coming to be is only in the gathering together of parts, and decaying in their separation, and then it is entirely contingent for them that something was there prior to the element. The reason for that is that none of them supported transformation.

C15c   [And his saying] “for this adheres to him, (that there are) things, some of which are these (arguments against the monists) in essence, while things occur that are necessarily characteristic” [means] that some of the impossible things that adhere to any who say that (the principal) element is one of the four adhere to Empedocles, while there are things peculiar to him.

C15d   [And his saying] “and we have spoken of things of which we witness some changing into others since they did not always stay in one state like fire and earth and body itself” [means] that on the business of these four bodies, it was explained in (Aristotle’s works on) natural science[44] that, since some of them were perceived to change into others in their incidentals and their formal substances, and they were the same in the bodily aspects given for them, it was explained of their affair that it is impossible for their arising to be by means of assembly and separation, I mean condensation and rarefaction; for rarefaction and condensation are not part of what necessitates that (process), a transformation in substance, nor (what necessitates) a transformation of quality when it is coming into establish-ment. Likewise it is contingent for those who say that the elements are undivided bodies that there is no alteration in substance there, nor in quality, nor transformation in one body itself from smallness to largeness, I mean in the amount of continuity where there is continuity, nor from form to form. This objection is common to Empedocles and to any who say that these four bodies are primal elements and that coming to be is by assembly and separation.

C15e   [Then he says] “and we have also spoken of them and of the cause of motions as to positing one or two causes in the account on natural affairs.” [He means] that he had spoken of these things in (works on) natural science, since it is the place where it is incumbent to speak of them, and he only mentions this science (i.e., metaphysics) [45] (there) in the mode of pointing out what of that is explained in natural science. Then in this science (proper) he considers whence (the causes) are existent, and that in the aspect of what the principle of substance is, not in the aspect of what is the principle(s?) of a natural body.[46]

C15f    For here in this science things are examined as to what kind of investigation, and the question is only in the aspect that is suitable for this inquiry. Therefore (in metaphysics) he gives the demonstration of the rightness or wrongness of the (very) question belonging to natural science, like he asks whether there is here a first substance prior to the sensory substances (in the first place). Then he imposes what was shown of that in natural science, that a prime mover does not (itself) move here, neither in itself nor by accident, and that it is the principle of the body moving by rotation. In this (metaphysical) science he also resolves the uncertainties encountered about the existence of (the sensory substances?).[47]

C15g   [And his saying] “he was not right, nor did he entirely and completely state an upright statement of the abolition of transformation. That is to say, it is necessarily contingent of one who holds this doctrine that cold is not from hot; nor hot from cold, because the same thing does not admit opposites” [means] that these (material pluralists) did not speak rightly as soon as they abolished transformation in quality and substance from the elements, because since they posited the (principal) elements or element as simple affairs, it was impossible for something cold to come from reversing hot, or something hot from cold; that is to say, it is impossible for the solitary thing[48] to admit influence and then be carried from heat to coldness or from coldness to heat, or in general from opposite to opposite. That is at odds with what attains perception, and likewise it is impossible for the element to be a body and simple if it changes from large to small or from small to large.

C15h   [And his saying] “and so it is necessary from that that the generated nature be one in itself, fire or water, and this is not what he says” [means] that when no transformation in substance, I mean in the (principal) element or elements, is there, it is necessary for the nature of the things composed of them to be the nature of the (principal) element insofar as it is the (principal) element, fire according to one who holds the nature of all things to be fire, and as is the (principal) element water (if) all things are water; and this is what none of them says, I mean that things composed of the elements suit the (principal) element in name and definition. (back to top) (annotation)

 

#16, Tafsīr 93.11-95.19, on 989a30-b6:

            As to Anaxagoras, if one accepts him as speaking of two elements, one accepts this especially according to an argument that he himself did not articulate but that necessarily follows for those who advance him.[49] For alleging that all is mixed at the beginning is absurd both otherwise and according to the necessity of an unmixed state occurring beforehand, plus according to a chance thing by nature not being mixed with chance things, and besides these reasons, that properties and contingencies would be separate from substances -- for of things that are mixed there is also separation.  Nevertheless, if one were to follow better articulations of what he wants to say, perhaps his statement would seem more modern.

T16      Then as to Anaxagoras being one who thinks that the elements are two, if he holds that (position) it is especially from an assertion he himself did not clearly grasp, while he was caused to follow deceptions (or errors?)[50] necessarily leading to that. It is unseemly[51] for existence to be induced into some state, and the statement on it is contrary to all things being mixed in the beginning; and then it is contingent that they were unmixed at first, and the mixing of things is not on account of insignificance, and along with that, for effects and incidents are separate from substances because their mixings and their separations are simultaneous. (However,) there is what smoothes the pursuit of truth in what he says, for the correct looms in his doctrines.

C16a   [He says] then as to Anaxagoras being one who thinks that the causes are two, mind in the mode of agent and the bodies of mutually resembling parts[52] in mixture, his doctrine did not set out the entire illustration of a statement, that is, did not explain the manner of existence of the mutually resembling bodies in mixture; nor as well did he uphold (the doctrine) by means of an adequate argument, but only held it through deceptions from statements necessarily leading to that (doctrine).

C16b   [And his saying] “it is unseemly for existence to come to be in some state, and the statement on it is contrary” [means] that it is unseemly for a person to say something on the principle of existents when it results from their affair that the existents are in a state contradicting what is said of their principles.

C16c   [And his saying] “the whole of things was mixed in the beginning” is an account from Anaxagoras, and (Aristotle) means by “the beginning” that which is called the mixture, and by “the mixed” the bodies with mutually resembling parts.

C16d   [And his saying] “and then it is contingent that they were unmixed at first” [means] that when Anaxagoras says that things were mixed in the beginning of their affair, it is then contingent that they were unmixed before that; and then mixing is not a beginning, because mixing is not understood except after separation, and (therefore) there having been a mixture from the first of the affair is not a comprehensible thing.

C16e   He thereupon cites another impossibility: It is contingent of the doctrine of Anaxagoras that the mixed mutually similar parts are insignificant(ly small) in the extreme, and then (Aristotle) says of it that real mixing is not by means of the smallness of the parts, because that mixing is only according to perception, while mixing is only real if the mixtures are transformed from one to another until an intermediate form is generated from that of the mixtures, like the form of oxymel[53] is generated by mixing vinegar and honey <and water>.[54]

C16f    Then he comes to another impossibility, [and so says] “and along with that, for effects and incidents are separate from substances because their mixings and their separations are simultaneous.” [He means] that along with that, then, is (the point) that accidents are separate from substances whenever substances are mixed, so that the mixing and the separating of the substances are accidents simultaneously, and the substances (after all) are not free of effects and accidents.

C16g   [And his saying] “there is what smoothes the pursuit of truth in what he says, for the correct looms in his doctrines” is as if he understands with it that with these doctrines Anaxa-goras was either wanting a reputation to be established by itself through them, or wanting the support of a well known laudable opinion through them, and it is more like (Aristotle) only suspects him of seeking reputation and a leading position because in (Anaxagoras’s) time there was no law by means of which the judgment of the support (or lack thereof) of the people of his time could indict (him), to banish him by some covenant according to law and thereby cause him great damage. (back to top) (annotation) (comments 17-24)