Averroës
on Aristotle’s Criticism of his Predecessors:
An annotated translation of the long commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics A
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9-16
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988a4-16 |
988b17-19 |
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#9,
Tafsīr 75.4-78.11, on 988a4-16:
(… while the form generates only
one; but clearly, from one material there is one table,)[1] while the bringer of the form, although one, makes many
(tables). And the male in relation to
the female is similar; for she is impregnated by one covering, while the male
impregnates many, and surely these are the images of those principles (relating
the forms to matter). Plato, then,
decided thusly on the objects of investigation, but it is clear from what has
been said that he uses only two causes: that from which is the “what is,” and
that concerning matter -- for the forms are causes of the “what is” of other
things; the one, (the cause of the “what is”) of the forms. And (it
is clear) what matter, the substratum, is, in the sense that it is said that
the forms are of sensory things, on the one hand, and that the one is in the
forms, on the other[2]: this
(matter/substratum) is dual, the great and the small. Moreover, he has given the cause of good and
of evil to the two elements, the one to one (i.e., the one) and the other to
the other (i.e., the great and the small),[3] just as we say
some earlier philosophers also attempted, like Empedocles and Anaxagoras.
T9 And the species differs[4]
in that it is one but does much, and similarly is the male in (doing) much; so
these are examples and similes of the principles which those (people?)[5]
used to hold. And then Plato defined
them in this way in his book on the (subject that is) sought, and it is
apparent from what has been said that he only used two causes: the quiddity[6]
of the thing and what is in the mode of matter; for species are the cause of
the quiddity of the remaining affairs, and then species are the
one. And the thing that is substrate matter is that in whose company
species are found, and in which are what is said to be in species; for the
quiddity of the two-fold is the great and the small, and also, for he presented
the cause of the good and the praiseworthy as the elements,[7] each one of them to those remaining,
and they are the things of which we have said examination occurred in the
beginnings. [Ịn the Greek (there
is) a blank.]
9a. [(As to) his saying] “and the species
differs in that it is one but does much, and similarly is the male in (doing)
much; so these are examples and similes of the principles which those (people)
used to hold,” that (statement) occurs cut off from what preceded it (in the
original Greek text), but is one of the kinds of argument that (those people)
used to profess in saying that forms are the making of individuals because
their nature resembles the nature of the male who does much, I mean that he
engenders many.
9b. And since this kind of argument is one of
what he states of their arguments that are omitted in (the translated) copy,
[he says (as already cited)] “and then these are examples and similes of the
principles.” [He means] that these are
the arguments and similes, reliance on which says that these things are
principles, I mean that given this kind of similarity that they presumed
between species and true principles, they presumed that species were
principles.
9c. [(As to) his saying] “and then Plato
defined them in this way in his book on the (subject) sought,” [that is] that
he defined species to be principles in the mode of form and the mode of agent.
9d. [Then he says] “and it is apparent that
he only used two causes alone: the quiddity of the thing and what is in the
mode of matter,” [that is,] that he made the quiddities of things and their
definitions the forms of things, and made matter the things of which they were
forms.
9e. [Then he says] “for species are the cause
of the quiddity of the remaining affairs.” [He means] (the preceding is so,)
for species, that is, forms, according to (Plato), are the quiddity of the
remaining things, I mean those which are not (themselves) forms.
9f. [And his saying] “and then (singular)
species is [8] the one; and the thing that is
substrate matter is that in whose company are found species” [means] that the
(plural) species that are truthfully called by that name are the totality of
the general form and matter, like the case where the human species is not its
form alone as Plato took it to be, but the totality of matter and form.
9g. [And his saying] “and in which is[9]
what is said to be in (plural) species; for the quiddity of the two-fold
(entity) is the great and the small” [means] that the indication that the forms
are not species is that it is said that the quiddity of the thing that is the form
is in the (singular) species, in the mode that it is part of (the species),
like two-fold(ness) is, for according to the holders of (the form’s) quiddity
as a principle, (the quiddity) is the great and the small, but the great and
the small are other than the two-fold (entity).
9h. [And his saying] “and for he also
presented the cause of the good and the praiseworthy as the elements,” [means]
of the indication that (Plato) professes matter and form, that he presented the
cause of the good and the praiseworthy and their opposite,[10]
and that (presentation?)[11]
is nothing but matter and form.
9i. [And his saying] “each one of them to
those remaining” [means] that (Plato) presented the cause of the remaining
things of the praiseworthy and the good appearing in existents by means of each
one of the two elements[12]
posited, matter and form.
9k. He then explains what those remaining
things are, [and so says] “and they are the things of which we have said examination
occurred in the beginnings.” [He means]
that these are later things appearing in existents, and are those for which one
wants their causes to be given by means of principles, and (for which) the
principles are authenticated by means of that (process). He only says that because, according to the
study of principles, their consistency is sought for all that appears in
existents. That is to say, when perceived affairs are inconsistent
with existents, then what is posited of their being principles of existents is
inauthentic, while when perceived affairs are consistent, then it is possible
for them to be authentic. It is not necessarily indicated by that
means that they are principles until perceived affairs indicate them, I mean
that when later affairs indicate the existence of earlier it is certain that
the earlier are principles. This was shown in working out the
demonstration.[13]
(back
to top) (annotation)
{That concludes
Chapter 6. Next, whether by choice or as
the result of what his translator has made available (i.e., if the lacuna he
reports extends throughout the omitted material), Averroës skips most of
Chapter 7, where Aristotle summarizes what his predecessors have or have not
seen, to take up material near its end.}
#10,
Tafsīr 78.12-79.7, on 988b17-19:
(That, then, we have correctly
distinguished the causes and how many and of what type,)[14]
all these (people) seem to bear witness for us, in their not being able to
touch on[15]
another cause; in addition, it is clear that principles are to be sought either
entirely thusly or in some such[16]
way.
T10 And (it is) fitting[17]
that all of these (?)[18] are testifying for us, because it is
impossible for them to add another cause, and along with that, for it is clear
that investigation comes to pass from principles, whether according to all of
these ways or according to some of them.
C10a [He says] it is fitting that what they (=
who?) said on the number of genera of causes, and what their investigation
ultimately got to, was the impossibility of adding a fifth cause to the causes
they cited, I mean the causes in the mode of matter, and (those) of form and of
purpose and of agent.
C10b [And his saying] “and along with that (it is
fitting,) for it is clear that investigation comes to pass from principles, be
it according to all of these ways or be it according to some of them” [means]
that along with this (it is fitting,) for since it was shown that the ancients
were unable to add to the number of principles we have cited, it is clear that
for each one of (all) existents the inquiry comes to pass either according to
all of those principles we have cited or according to some of them. (back to top) (annotation)
#11,
Tafsīr 79.8-81.14, on 988b20-29:
After this we should go over the
possible problems of how each of these (earlier thinkers) has spoken and of
what he holds about the principles (or: … we should go over how each … has
spoken and the possible problems of what he holds … ).[19] (End of Chapter 7, 988b20-21.)
(Beginning Chapter 8 within the same
Arabic text, 988b22-29:) Now clearly
the likes of those who make everything one, and some one nature as its
material, with this having body and extent, err in many ways. For they make elements only of bodies, not of
the bodiless, [and of bodiless beings (there are some)].[20] Also, their undertakings to speak about the
causes of generation and destruction, and about all discussion of nature,
abolish the cause of motion. Besides, in
this they do not make substance the cause of anything, nor the “what is” (of
anything).
T11 And then after this we shall consider how
each one of them(?)[21]
spoke on (the principles) and how it is possible for him to be doubted by the
doubts with which it is possible to be skeptical on the principles. And it is clear that all of those who posited
some one nature for everything, it being material, and made it bodily, of the
essence of magnitude, have erred in a variety of ways, because they only
posited elements of bodies alone, and not non-bodily affairs. And they wanted to speak on the causes of
becoming and decaying, and to speak as well on the rest of things in any nature
discussion; yet they abolished the cause of motion. For they also posited no cause at all of[22]
substance, nor spoke of its quiddity.
C11a [He says] we are finished with citing the
opinions of these (thinkers) on the principles, and after that statement we
want to speak of the manner of the statement of each one of them on the
principle he posited, I mean in what way his positing was a principle; of the
scope of the argument that moved him to that; and out of the doubts that
concern the principles, of those with which it is possible to be skeptical of
(these thinkers).
C11b He then commences the account of attendant
doubts about (the opinions), and begins that (account) with the people he cited
first, [and so he says] “and it is clear that all of those who posited some one
nature for everything, it being material, and made it bodily, of the essence of
magnitude, have erred in a variety of ways.”
[He means] it is clear that the ancients who posited a single nature for
everything, it being material, and made it bodily, whether fire or air or
water, have erred in a variety of ways.
C11c He then comes to their first error, [and
says] “because they posited elements of bodies alone, and not non-bodily
affairs.” [He means] that the first of
their errors was that they posited the primary element as one of the bodies,
and did not posit any substance not of a body.
That is to say, (as to) body, what is perceived of its affair is that it
is composite, and therefore becoming and decaying befalls it, meaning that it
is necessary that the primary element neither becomes nor decays, because
(i.e., therefore) it has been contingent that there is an element of the
element. And that (argument) passes to
infinity.
C11d He then cites the deficiency that entered
with their positing the first principle as one of the bodies, [and so says]
“and they wanted to speak on the causes of becoming and decaying, and to speak
on the rest of things in any nature discussion.” [He means] that by means of this position
they wanted to speak on the causes of becoming and decaying, and then according
to that (position) could not, because true becoming and decay is only found for
bodies; but despite this they were able to speak on what transcends becoming,
like something not of nature, by their diverging from making mathematical
affairs the principles of natural affairs -- as if he praises them in this
aspect.
C11e He then takes up relating what their
deficiency was in the principles of natural affairs as well, [and so says] “yet
they abolished the cause of motion.” [He
means] that yet, along with their revealing a material reason and their
acknowledging that things move, they neglected to mention the cause of the
motion of matter, whereas it is impossible for matter to move by itself.
C11f [Then he says] “and they also posited no
cause of substance at all, nor spoke of its quiddity.” [He means] that along with their neglect of
the agent reason, they also neglected the cause of the substances (which might
be) attributed to (this cause), those which actually become substances and
stand in themselves, and it is the cause that is quiddity and form.
(back to top) (annotation)
#12,
Tafsīr 81.15-84.14, on 988b29-34:
And besides this they say
simplistically that any one of the simple bodies whatsoever, save earth, is a
principle, not reflecting on how these, I mean fire and water and earth and
air, are made by arising from one another.
For they arise by coming together or separating from one another, and
this makes the most difference for what is anterior and what posterior.
T12 And along with that they then say facilely
that the simple bodies are the principle, because in their study of becoming
they do not authorize some of them arising from others, save earth, I mean fire
and water and air, except that some of them only come to be from others in the
mode of assembly and some in the mode of separation, and this becomes their
state at first, while at the end they differ by a great difference.
C12a [He says] that all the ancients speak as if
it is a simple affair for the (principal) element[23]
to be one of these three, I mean fire or air or water, save earth, along with
their authorizing(?)[24]
what is most conducive of all of them to being the (principal) element in one
way; and then no statement of any of them, I mean a statement of one who says
that it is fire or air or water, is more primary than the statement of his
colleague.[25] The reason for that, that is, that the
indication of (principal) element by one of them is not more primary than the
indication of the other, is that they, that is to say, each one who was more
inclined to one of (the elements) except earth being the (principal) element,
followed a common procedure in that (process).
And then he only inferred that (indicated principal element) from the
remaining (elements) being formed from it, either in the mode of assembly or in
the mode of separation; that is, the condensation or rarefaction happening to
them is on the part of the portions of which they are composed. That is to say, the one who says the
(principal) element is fire only believes it to be the (principal) element
because the remaining (elements) have been formed from it in the mode of
assembly, that is, condensation, and that is to say, this alleges that when
fire thickens, air arises from that, and when air thickens, water arises out of
it. The one who believes that it is air
makes it a (principal) element entirely in two ways, I mean rarefaction and
condensation; that is, when it is rarified it becomes fire and when it thickens
it becomes water. And the one who holds
that the (principal) element is water also holds that when it thickens it
becomes earth and when it is rarified it becomes air. And since none of them said that what
characterized the (principal) element was rarefaction, none said that earth was
the (principal) element of the remaining (elements), while that had been
possible in the mode of this logic.
(Aristotle) only means that if becoming is posited in this way it is
made necessary that every one of (the elements) be a (principal) element for
those remaining.
C12b [And (as to) his saying] “while at the end
they differ by a great difference,” the appearance of his statement is that he
regards (the thinkers) in their making the direction of the difference
between the element and what is generated from it by means of condensation and
rarefaction. (He does so) because if it is granted that (their doing
this) is the reason for the diversity in element and (in) what of the four
bodies is generated from the primary element, then this is by holding that that
(means of condensation and rarefaction) is a mode and a possibility. Indeed, when the eventual difference between
existents and these simple bodies and compounds of them is demanded, it is not
tolerable that anyone reach the cause by means of (thinking of) condensation
and rarefaction. That is to say, the
basis of things that are generated from the four elements differs from the
basis of the elements by a great difference, and also the compounds of any of
them differ from others by a great difference.
It cannot be said of (the difference) that it is by means of
condensation and rarefaction, because all of these (elements and compounds)
differ from one another in quiddity and definition, like the contrast of flesh
and bone to the four elements, and like the contrast of bone to flesh.
C12c It is unlikely that this statement is an
account from them, and a general excuse attaches to them from this misgiving
(i.e., the problem just noted). I mean
that [his (just cited) saying] “while at the end they differ by a great
difference” is as if they said that the difference (between the materials) in
themselves is insignificant, due to their difference only being in condensation
and rarefaction, not the compounding of the simple (body). Then when existents are finally generated
from (the four elements) there is a more diverse diversity in the multiplicity
of the mixture of kinds of condensation and rarefaction of the existent in the
simple (bodies). Nonetheless, the
relation of each of these existents to the nature of whatever of these four was
held to be the (principal) element indicates that (their proponents) did not
excuse their statement in the manner of this apology; I mean that one who was
saying that the element was fire said that the quiddity of all existents was
fire, and that they become fire afterwards, and similarly the statement of one
who said the element was air or water.
(back to top) (annotation)
#13,
Tafsīr 84.15-86.6, on 988b34-989a5:
For on the one hand one might
think the most elementary of all to be that from which (the four elements) come
to be at first by combining, and such would be the most finely divided and
smallest of bodies. Therefore (to begin a parenthetical comment)
those who make fire the principle would speak especially in conformance with
this argument; though each of the others also agrees that the element of
bodies is such.[26]
T13 And then of all these opinions, the
opinion that is the most fitting for regularity is holding that (the four
elements) are from the first mixing, and then this (mixing) is of the smallest
of bodies; and therefore all who say that the principle is fire come to settle
on that (position) and hold it, and (= but) in this way each one of them
recognizes the definition of (principal) element as this, I mean that it is
that thing of bodies whose degree is ultimate.
C13a [He says] that the preferable opinion of
what is said on the elements, and that bestows consistency on what appears in
defining the (principal) element and in presenting the reasons for what appears
in changeable affairs, is holding that these elements are composed from the
first mixing, which is of undivided bodies.
C13b [His saying] “therefore all who say that
the principle is fire come to settle on that (position) and hold it” [means]
that therefore one who says the principle is fire then comes to recognizing
contingently that the (principal) element is undivided bodies, because since
fire becomes a principle for them only by means of being finer, and is finer
for them by means of smallness of parts, it is perhaps necessary for small
parts to be the principle.
C13c [And his saying] “and in this way each one
of them recognizes the definition of (principal) element as this, I mean that
whose degree is ultimate” [means] that with regard to holding that the parts
are undivided, everyone of those who hold that (opinion) avows that the
definition of (principal) element is that it is that whose degree is last in
existence (and) first in time and becoming, not one who says that <the
definition of?>[27]
the (principal) element is <that it is> one of the simple bodies, because
none of these bodies is of last degree in existence, meaning that this
statement alone suits the definition of (principal) element, and holding it is
contingent of one whose avowal is by the definition of (principal)
element. And one who does not hold that
the parts (of the principal element) are undivided cannot hold the definition
of (principal) element. (back to top) (annotation)
#14,
Tafsīr 86.7-89.3, on 989a5-18:
At any rate, none of those
speaking of one element deems earth worthy, clearly because of its coarse
parts. Some arbiter grasps each of the
(other) three elements, for some say this is fire, others water, and others
air, but why do they never say earth as well, like most people? For
they say all is earth, and also Hesiod says earth arises first of the bodies;
thus antiquity and populace agree on it as the understanding (to conclude the
parenthetical comment).[28] According to this argument, then, neither any
of these (monists) who said something other than fire, nor any who posited this
(principle) to be denser than air but finer than water,[29]
would be right. On the other hand,[30]
if what comes to be later is by nature primary,[31]
i.e., the concocted[32]
and the assembled is later in generation, this would be the opposite, water
before air and earth before water.
T14 It is clear from their concern that those
who say that the (principal) element is one and that it is earth only hold that
by reason of the largeness of (its) parts, while each one of the (other) three
elements is singled out by someone among (these thinkers), some saying that it
is fire and others water and others air. They do not say that earth
is a thing of (the possible principal elements), like a great many people used
to say, that all things are earth; and Hesiod[33]
says that earth is the first principle of bodies and it used to be believed
that that (opinion) was a well known affair.
In accordance with this account, none of those who held to fire alone of
these (elements), nor any of those who posited that air is denser than fire and
finer than water, spoke a correct statement.
And then if that whose becoming is primary is later in existence by
nature,[34]
and the becoming of the cooked and the distinguished is later, then the holder
of water being prior to air and earth prior to water spoke according to the
converse.
C14a [He says] “it is clear that those who say
that the (principal) element is earth only hold that by reason of the largeness
of (its) parts,”[35]
because when fineness is by reason of the smallness of parts, coarseness is
necessarily in accordance with largeness; and these (people) spoke like what he
says, that they spoke the opposite about the (principal) element of what its
situation demands, because that whose degree is ultimate by nature is smaller.
C14b [And his saying] “while each one of the
(other) three elements is singled out by someone among (these thinkers)” [up to
his saying] “that was a well known affair” [means] that by the stance of
fleeing from positing the (principal) element as something not demanding the
definition of (principal) element, none of the physicists held that earth was
the element; they only held the three alone, and then some said that it was
fire, the nearest to the definition of (principal) element, and some said air
or water, the two furthest from the definition of (principal) element, that is
to say, they were nearest in one way but furthest in another: near for one who
supported air, because with him air is smaller of parts than water, but far
because with him it is greater of parts than fire. And like that was the situation of one who
said that it was water, that is to say, it is finer than earth and coarser than
air. The man[36]
he cites was a famous man compared with them[37]
in positing rules[38]
and rule-based mysteries.[39]
C14c [His saying] “in accordance with this
account, none of those who held fire alone of these (elements), nor any of
those who posited that air is denser than fire and finer than water, spoke a
correct statement” [means] according to the account of any who said that earth
was the (principal) element by its being greatest of parts, the account of none
who said that the (principal) element was fire or air or water was a correct
account: neither the one who said it was fire because his statement
contradicted that statement, nor the one who made it one of the remaining two
elements because (this makes) large of the small and small of the large and is
an extremely inconsistent statement.
C14d [Then he says] “and then if that whose
becoming is primary is later by nature, and the becoming of the cooked and the
distinguished is later, then the holder of water being prior to air and earth
prior to water spoke according to the converse.” [He means] that if what comes to be earlier
in time is later by nature, it is the (principal) element, while what comes to
be later in time is generated as distinguished from the element, or cooked from
it, or however you want to say it; and then one who says air is the element of
fire, and water the element of air, and in general one who makes the coarser
the element of the finer, has then spoken the converse of the definition of
(principal) element, because when water is prior to air in becoming while water
is of parts greater than the parts of air, then the greater has been made prior
to the smaller in becoming, and an element of it, while it is clear that the
smaller is prior to the greater in becoming since the greater dissolves into
the smaller. And then as he says, these
(people) held something opposite to one who says that the smaller is the element
of the larger and is what suits the definition of (principal) element. (back to top) (annotation)
#15,
Tafsīr 89.4-93.10, on 989a18-30:
Let that be said, then, about the
sort whom we have said posited one cause.
And it is the same if one posits more, like Empedocles saying that
four bodies are the material. For also
in this (view) some things are the same, while necessarily distinctive things
occur; for we see things generated from one another, as the same body does not
always persist as fire or earth -- this is said about them in (our writings) on
nature -- and it is to be thought that he did not speak entirely rightly or
rationally(?)[40]
as to whether one or two causes of motions are to be posited. And for those who speak thusly it is
necessary to entirely abolish alteration; for cold is not from heat, nor heat
from cold, for then something would suffer being both opposites, or something
of a single nature would become fire and water, which he does not say.
T15 And
then let the statements that have been cited be what is said of those who
posited one cause, however it is said that they speak; and we(?) shall
follow[41] this road in essence in relation to
those who posit more than one, like Empedocles, for he says that the material
bodies are four; for this (?)[42]
is that there are things adhering to him, some of which are these (arguments
against the monists) in essence, while things occur that are necessarily
characteristic; and we have spoken of things of which we witness some changing
into others since they did not always stay in one state like fire and earth and
body itself; and we have also spoken of
them and of the cause of motions as to positing one or two causes in the
account on natural affairs; and (Empedocles) was not right, nor did he
entirely and completely state an upright statement of the abolition of
transformation. That is to say, it is
necessarily contingent of one who holds this doctrine that cold is not from
hot; nor hot from cold, because the same thing does not admit opposites; and so it is therefore necessary that the
generated nature be one in itself, fire or water, (and)[43]
this is not what he says.
C15a [He says] then let these objections be
employed with respect to those who say that the material cause is one body of
these three or four bodies, whatever body it is.
C15b [Then he says] “and we shall follow this road in essence in relation to those
who posit more than one, like Empedocles, for he says that the material bodies
are four.” [He means] that, just as it
was contingent of the upholders of one (principal) element that that element be
a composite of parts, so it is contingent of Empedocles, because every one of
them thinks that coming to be is only in the gathering together of parts, and
decaying in their separation, and then it is entirely contingent for them that
something was there prior to the element.
The reason for that is that none of them supported transformation.
C15c [And his saying] “for this adheres to him,
(that there are) things, some of which are these (arguments against the
monists) in essence, while things occur that are necessarily characteristic”
[means] that some of the impossible things that adhere to any who say that (the
principal) element is one of the four adhere to Empedocles, while there are
things peculiar to him.
C15d [And his saying] “and we have spoken of
things of which we witness some changing into others since they did not always
stay in one state like fire and earth and body itself” [means] that on the
business of these four bodies, it was explained in (Aristotle’s works on)
natural science[44]
that, since some of them were perceived to change into others in their incidentals
and their formal substances, and they were the same in the bodily aspects given
for them, it was explained of their affair that it is impossible for their
arising to be by means of assembly and separation, I mean condensation and
rarefaction; for rarefaction and condensation are not part of what necessitates
that (process), a transformation in substance, nor (what necessitates) a
transformation of quality when it is coming into establishment. Likewise it is contingent for those who say
that the elements are undivided bodies that there is no alteration in substance
there, nor in quality, nor transformation in one body itself from smallness to
largeness, I mean in the amount of continuity where there is continuity, nor
from form to form. This objection is
common to Empedocles and to any who say that these four bodies are primal
elements and that coming to be is by assembly and separation.
C15e [Then he says] “and we have also spoken of them and of the cause of motions as to
positing one or two causes in the account on natural affairs.” [He means] that he had spoken of these things
in (works on) natural science, since it is the place where it is incumbent to
speak of them, and he only mentions this science (i.e., metaphysics) [45]
(there) in the mode of pointing out what of that is explained in natural
science. Then in this science (proper)
he considers whence (the causes) are existent, and that in the aspect of what
the principle of substance is, not in the aspect of what is the principle(s?)
of a natural body.[46]
C15f For here in this science things are
examined as to what kind of investigation, and the question is only in the
aspect that is suitable for this inquiry.
Therefore (in metaphysics) he gives the demonstration of the rightness
or wrongness of the (very) question belonging to natural science, like he asks
whether there is here a first substance prior to the sensory substances (in the
first place). Then he imposes what was
shown of that in natural science, that a prime mover does not (itself) move
here, neither in itself nor by accident, and that it is the principle of the
body moving by rotation. In this
(metaphysical) science he also resolves the uncertainties encountered about the
existence of (the sensory substances?).[47]
C15g [And his saying] “he was not right, nor did he entirely and completely state an
upright statement of the abolition of transformation. That is to say, it is necessarily contingent
of one who holds this doctrine that cold is not from hot; nor hot from cold,
because the same thing does not admit opposites” [means] that these (material
pluralists) did not speak rightly as soon as they abolished transformation in
quality and substance from the elements, because since they posited the
(principal) elements or element as simple affairs, it was impossible for
something cold to come from reversing hot, or something hot from cold; that is
to say, it is impossible for the solitary thing[48]
to admit influence and then be carried from heat to coldness or from coldness
to heat, or in general from opposite to opposite. That is at odds with what attains perception,
and likewise it is impossible for the element to be a body and simple if it
changes from large to small or from small to large.
C15h [And his saying] “and so it is necessary from that that the generated nature be one in
itself, fire or water, and this is not what he says” [means] that when
no transformation in substance, I mean in the (principal) element or elements,
is there, it is necessary for the nature of the things composed of them to be
the nature of the (principal) element insofar as it is the (principal) element,
fire according to one who holds the nature of all things to be fire, and as is
the (principal) element water (if) all things are water; and this is what none
of them says, I mean that things composed of the elements suit the (principal)
element in name and definition. (back to
top) (annotation)
#16,
Tafsīr 93.11-95.19, on 989a30-b6:
As to Anaxagoras, if one accepts
him as speaking of two elements, one accepts this especially according to an
argument that he himself did not articulate but that necessarily follows for
those who advance him.[49] For alleging that all is mixed at the
beginning is absurd both otherwise and according to the necessity of an unmixed
state occurring beforehand, plus according to a chance thing by nature not
being mixed with chance things, and besides these reasons, that properties and contingencies
would be separate from substances -- for of things that are mixed there is also
separation. Nevertheless, if one were to follow better articulations
of what he wants to say, perhaps his statement would seem more modern.
T16 Then as to Anaxagoras being one who thinks
that the elements are two, if he holds that (position) it is especially from an
assertion he himself did not clearly grasp, while he was caused to follow
deceptions (or errors?)[50]
necessarily leading to that. It is
unseemly[51]
for existence to be induced into some state, and the statement on it is
contrary to all things being mixed in the beginning; and then it is contingent
that they were unmixed at first, and the mixing of things is not on account of
insignificance, and along with that, for effects and incidents are separate
from substances because their mixings and their separations are simultaneous.
(However,) there is what smoothes the pursuit of truth in what he says, for the
correct looms in his doctrines.
C16a [He says] then as to Anaxagoras being one
who thinks that the causes are two, mind in the mode of agent and the bodies of
mutually resembling parts[52]
in mixture, his doctrine did not set out the entire illustration of a
statement, that is, did not explain the manner of existence of the mutually
resembling bodies in mixture; nor as well did he uphold (the doctrine) by means
of an adequate argument, but only held it through deceptions from statements
necessarily leading to that (doctrine).
C16b [And his saying] “it is unseemly for
existence to come to be in some state, and the statement on it is contrary”
[means] that it is unseemly for a person to say something on the principle of
existents when it results from their affair that the existents are in a state
contradicting what is said of their principles.
C16c [And his saying] “the whole of things was
mixed in the beginning” is an account from Anaxagoras, and (Aristotle) means by
“the beginning” that which is called the mixture, and by “the mixed” the bodies
with mutually resembling parts.
C16d [And his saying] “and then it is contingent
that they were unmixed at first” [means] that when Anaxagoras says that things
were mixed in the beginning of their affair, it is then contingent that they
were unmixed before that; and then mixing is not a beginning, because mixing is
not understood except after separation, and (therefore) there having been a
mixture from the first of the affair is not a comprehensible thing.
C16e He thereupon cites another
impossibility: It is contingent of the
doctrine of Anaxagoras that the mixed mutually similar parts are
insignificant(ly small) in the extreme, and then (Aristotle) says of it that
real mixing is not by means of the smallness of the parts, because that mixing
is only according to perception, while mixing is only real if the mixtures are
transformed from one to another until an intermediate form is generated from
that of the mixtures, like the form of oxymel[53]
is generated by mixing vinegar and honey <and water>.[54]
C16f Then he comes to another impossibility,
[and so says] “and along with that, for effects and incidents are separate from
substances because their mixings and their separations are simultaneous.” [He means] that along with that, then, is
(the point) that accidents are separate from substances whenever substances are
mixed, so that the mixing and the separating of the substances are accidents
simultaneously, and the substances (after all) are not free of effects and
accidents.
C16g [And his saying] “there is what smoothes the
pursuit of truth in what he says, for the correct looms in his doctrines” is as
if he understands with it that with these doctrines Anaxagoras was either
wanting a reputation to be established by itself through them, or wanting the
support of a well known laudable opinion through them, and it is more like
(Aristotle) only suspects him of seeking reputation and a leading position
because in (Anaxagoras’s) time there was no law by means of which the judgment
of the support (or lack thereof) of the people of his time could indict (him),
to banish him by some covenant according to law and thereby cause him great
damage. (back to top)
(annotation)
(comments
17-24)